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Corporate Hypergoals,
Sustainable
Peace, and the Adapted Firm
Thomas W. Dunfee*
Timothy L. Fort**
ABSTRACT

Hypergoals are a set of specifiable goals applicable to all
publicly-owned, for-profit corporations independent of their
purpose, type, business, or legal governance. The identification
of hypergoals should be limited to those factors for which a
plausible empirical case can be made concerning their role as
essential foundations for efficient business interaction. In the
context of hypergoals, corporations have a role to play in
working toward global, sustainablepeace. In working toward
the hypergoal of sustainablepeace, corporations must attend to
two tiers: an immediate, short-term orientation to foster
solidarity with local populations in which the corporation works
and a longer-term orientationto abide by the specific norms that
have been linked to sustainable peace. A framework of
corporate decision strategies for dealing with issues such as the
violence associated with the distribution of conflict diamonds is
presented.
Traditional strategies include the Corporate
Imperalist, the Corporate Chameleon, the Corporate
Nationalist, and the Corporate Opportunist. The model of the
Adapted Firm, which would pursue certain identified
hypergoals, would better face the challenges posed by conflict
diamonds than would other models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate survival of humanity depends on controlling a
strong propensity toward the use of violence to resolve conflicts.
Similarly, an environment conducive for business transactions
requires certainty, minimized violence and maximized human choice.
This Article explores the role of corporations in contributing to
sustainable peace. It begins by analyzing the potential for identifying
"hypergoals" applicable to all publicly-owned, for-profit corporations,
independent of their purpose, type, business, or legal governance.
Second, candidate hypergoals of transparency and contributing to
sustainable peace are identified and discussed. Third, the specific
role of business corporations in contributing to sustainable peace is
explored and a decision framework is presented that helps to identify
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strategies corporations may follow in resolving conflicts and
The application of the framework is
minimizing violence.
demonstrated through an analysis of the current controversy
surrounding the marketing and distribution of conflict diamonds.
Finally, the Article presents the aspirational Adapted Firm as a
model of how business firms may best contribute to the hypergoal of
sustainable peace.
The central point of this Article is that in identifying sustainable
peace as a teleological end for corporate practice, a series of
empirically grounded obligations becomes relevant. Given the scope
of this Article, it will be beneficial to bear in mind the characteristics
of the Adapted Firm, our model for how corporations can best
contribute to peace. In many important respects, the Adapted Firm is
simply a firm practicing good citizenship as advocated by others in
the field of business ethics. However, by linking such behavior to a
quest for peace, the motivations for being ethical become clearer. The
Adapted Firm survives because it is attentive to the immediate, local
emotions and sentiments of the stakeholders affected by corporate
action. The Adapted Firm also contributes to a longer-term survival
by insisting on certain practices correlated to peace, to wit: providing
economic development, being open to external evaluation of actions
(including transparency and support for the rule of law), and proactively practicing good citizenship-particularly with respect to
strengthening the voice of corporate stakeholders. The Adapted Firm
thus consciously commits itself to two levels of decision-making
analysis: (1) a commitment to a hypergoal of sustainable peace and
the practices associated with sustainable peace, and (2) a
commitment to attending to the immediate sentiments of local
constituents, including those of shareholders.

II. HYPERGOALS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Is it possible to identify a set of specifiable goals applicable to all
publicly owned, for-profit corporations independent of their purpose,
type, business, or legal governance? We coin the term, "hypergoals,"
to reflect the extensive authority and reach of such principles. If
corporate hypergoals can be identified, the implications are farreaching. Given emerging evidence of practices that appear to
correlate to peace, the acceptance of hypergoals would imply that all
corporations share a core set of fundamental obligations. In this
Section we examine the possibility of identifying plausible
hypergoals.
The extraordinary diversity of types and forms of corporations
National
surely seems to constrain the search for hypergoals.
approaches to corporate governance vary widely and allow a veritable

566

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:563

garden of corporate forms to bloom. In spite of recent tendencies
toward greater commonality, the unique attributes of German,
Japanese, and U.S. corporations demonstrate the considerable range
of extant variations.1
These national differences have a major
impact on the goals of the corporations formed under their regimes.
On the face of it, the diversity of forms of corporate law seems to
counter any claim that a set of hypergoals standing independently of
a legal regime can be identified. Yet this diversity has not prevented
scholars from attempting to articulate universal norms applicable to
all corporations; in this study nor do we shy away from proposing
universal goals underlying those norms.
Research on universality in the field of business ethics has
focused on the question of identifying moral responsibilities
obligating all corporations. This topic has attracted considerable
interest resulting in commentators developing concepts of "moral
minimums," 2 "hypernorms," 3 and "guidelines"'4 that establish moral
obligations that are considered binding for global corporations.
In general, those searching for universal moral obligations
ground their principles in established moral and ethical theory.
Thomas Donaldson bases his moral minimums in social contract
theory5 while Richard DeGeorge employs a pluralistic, ecumenical
approach reflecting multiple ethical theories.6 In their search for
moral universals, commentators have often found it necessary to limit
their analysis to only certain types of corporations and contexts.
Thus, DeGeorge makes it clear that his Guidelines apply only to U.S.
and European corporations doing business in less-developed
countries. 7 Donaldson limits his analysis to global or multinational
corporations. 8 The fact that these thoughtful commentators find it
necessary to limit their analysis to certain types of corporations
implies that it is impossible to develop more-generalized standards

1.
See Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a
Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAVL L.
829 (2000); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation
in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads,62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9 (1999).
2.
See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION (C. Lenhardt & S.W. Nicholsen trans., 1990) (establishing the argument for
basic minimums upon which thicker notions of morality might later be derived).
3.
THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 49-82 (1999)
4.
RICHARD T. DEGEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS (1993).
5.
THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1989).
6.
DEGEORGE, supra note 4, at 23-41.
7.
Id. at 43-45.

8.

DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 65-94.
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that would, for example, also apply with equal force to corporations
from less-developed or communist countries.
The pragmatic limitations recognized by Donaldson and
DeGeorge are not based on facts or assumptions that exclude the
possibility of identifying hypergoals. Instead, they are explicitly
offering guidance to a designated set of decisionmakers.
Their
primary analysis appears extendable to all types of corporations, and
we see no reason to severely constrain the search for hypergoals. As
a consequence, we impose only a minor limit on our analysis. We
focus solely on profit-making corporations with public ownership.
Non-profit organizations bring in too many variables for a focused
analysis because their missions may relate to non-business activities
carried on in furtherance of non-economic goals. 9 The use of the
corporate form in such circumstances is a legal formality designed to
provide the promoters with limited liability or tax benefits. Similarly,
we exclude privately-owned firms. Although all corporations have
certain obligations under typical regimes of corporate governance and
are subject to public criminal and regulatory laws, privately owned
firms are unique in the aspect of our core focus-the goals of the
organization. Privately-held firms are operated in furtherance of the
goals of the owner(s), which may involve unique personal
commitments. Thus, private firms are in direct contrast to publiclyheld firms that are understood to have certain generic goals
pertaining to the assumed interests of their shareholders and the
needs of the state. 10 Finally, we exclude government or state-owned
corporations. 1 '
State-owned corporations must be seen as
instruments whose goals correlate with states' public and foreign
policy objectives. 12 These exclusions are not meant to suggest that
hypergoals do not apply to these organizations; instead, we simply
wish to address our attention to the ways in which hypergoals are
applicable to for-profit corporations.

9.
For example, many professional academic organizations are incorporated as
non-profits. Their primary goals may be only to publish journals and to hold annual
meetings of their membership. The focus of some associations is inward on the needs
of their membership, with only limited consideration of those outside of the
organization.
10.
This dichotomy is captured in seemingly contradictory language in the 1994
Company Law of China. Article 102 of the statute provides that shareholders "shall be
the organ of authority of the company," while Article 14 provides that "companies must
* . . strengthen the establishment of a socialist spiritual civilization, and accept the
supervision of the government and the public." Thomas W. Dunfee & Danielle Warren,

Is Guanxi Ethical?A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China, J. BUS. ETHICS,
Aug. 2001, at 191 (citing the Company Law of China, articles 14 and 102).
11.
See Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, CorporateGovernance in China: Then
and Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (analyzing the dimensions of state-owned
corporations within the context of China).
12.
Id.
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A. The Case for Hypergoals
This Article first explores the case for the identification of
hypergoals by engaging in a pragmatic normative analysis. That is, it
first considers whether there are rational and moral arguments
supporting the existence or identification of manifest, universal
hypergoals. This Article then considers whether hypergoals are
compatible with existing legal and economic regimes.
1. The Rational, Instrumental Argument
Business activity requires a sustaining environment. It cannot
reach its full potential in repressive circumstances, such as those that
existed for "blackmarket" entrepreneurial activities in the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. 13 Political institutions can be used to
prohibit business operations through aggressive criminalization. In
order to thrive, business demands more than a merely-neutral state.
Efficient background institutions must enforce contracts and minimal
property rights while policing fraud and theft. 14 In addition, a
nurturing business environment requires that its practitioners hold
compatible values, particularly those associated with fundamental
honesty and promise-keeping. 15 Francis Fukuyama recognizes the
importance of societal social capital and extends that recognition to
the claim that economic "[c]ommunities depend on mutual trust and
16
will not arise spontaneously without it.'
Fukayama and others argue that in order to thrive, an economy
requires the structures of liberal democracy. 1 7 It is true that many of
the most successful economies have been found in democratic,
capitalist countries. Yet, there are counterexamples; China is a non-

13.

See R.T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRIME: BLACK MARKETS, ILLEGAL FINANCE,

AND THE UNDERWORLD ECONOMY 38 (2002) (explaining how the emergence of Russia's
mafia came from the dysfunctions of communist society).
14.
See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (W.W. Bartley ed., 1988).
Background institutions include courts and police forces, regulatory agencies, executive
branch bureaus with responsibility for business regulation, and NGOs such as the Red
Cross and Red Crescent. For a provocative argument connecting property rights and
sustainable peace, see 0. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property,
Liberty, and Corporate Governance, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (2003).
See DEGEORGE, supra note 4, at 26-27 (discussing the importance of
15.
background institutions).
16.

FRANCIS FUKAYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF

PROSPERITY 25 (1995).
17.

Id.
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democratic nation that has had economic success,1 8 while India, a
practicing democracy, is a mediocre economic performer.1 9 For our
purposes, we assume that no case been made that a particular form of
government is a prerequisite for a successful business environment.
Thus following Fukuyama, Hayek and others, we focus on the
following twin pillars as the keys for a nurturing business
environment: (1) sufficient social capital in the form of individual
values conducive to exchange, and (2) efficient background
institutions necessary to develop and maintain sufficient levels of
essential social capital. Business firms may act in ways that either
support or weaken these pillars. The Enron case is instructive. The
company aggressively lobbied to exempt itself from regulation by the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission and from certain energy
regulation oversight. 20 Thus given the opportunity to act in an
unrestrained, opaque way, the firm engaged in self-serving
opportunism that ultimately contributed to an undermining of
business credibility in the United States. These and similar abuses
at Tyco, Worldcom, Xerox, RiteAide, and many others caused a severe
reaction both in capital markets and among regulators. 21 It is likely
that some of the reactions to the loss of credibility will be overbroad
and will ultimately constrain business efficiency. Ultimately, though,
the blame for any reduction in efficiency must rest not with
regulators or investors, but rather with those managers who so
22
aggressively abused the system.
More broadly and systemically, the pervasive corruption that
exists today harms background institutions, particularly in
developing countries, and often in very significant ways.
Transparency
International,
the
corruption-fighting
non-

18.
See, e.g., MARGARET M. PEARSON, CHINA'S NEw BUSINESS ELITE (1997)
(analyzing of the growing strength of the business class in China that has arisen apart
from democratization of the country's politics).
19.
See, e.g., B.N.P Setlur, We Need This Passion, but for Another Battle, INDIAN
EXPESS, May 31, 2002, at http://www.indianexpress.comlfullstory.php?content id=3564
(arguing that the passion for a war against Pakistan needs to be rechannelled to revive an
economy "in shambles").
20.
See, e.g., John A. Byrne et al., How to Fix Corporate Governance, BUS.
WEEK, May 6, 2002, at 69.
21.
Id.
22.
A central premise of Milton Friedman's arguments, after all, is that
managers have a duty to shareholders, not to themselves. The corporate scandals are
more about managerial profiting at the expense of the shareholders rather than
shareholder abuse of other stakeholders. Michael O'Hara makes a similar point in this
volume with respect to the extent to which businesses managers actually allocate
resources to cover risks; frequently, they do not fund even a small amount to what
might be seen as minimal risk, but in doing so, there is a lack of managerial attention
to the risks actually faced by businesses. Michael O'Hara, Governing for Genuine
Profit, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765 (2003).
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governmental organization (NGO) located in Berlin emphasizes that
there is both a demand side and a supply side to corruption. 23 The
demand side is reflected in corrupt government officials who request
or accept bribes or both. 24 Corporate managers who willingly pay or
even offer payments are the supply side. 25 Corruption distorts the
decisions of background political institutions, reducing their
efficiency. 26 It also weakens public trust in those organizations while
at the same time destroying social capital. 2 7
Corruption is
particularly pernicious in its damaging effects on the overall
28
environment for business activity.
Although business has the power to harm the pillars of a
nurturing environment, it also has the power to contribute in positive
ways to strengthen them. The efficient functioning of background
institutions is highly dependent upon honest and fair dealing on the
part of the business firms. 2 9
Respecting the jurisdiction and
authority of those institutions responsible for regulating business is
also critical, as the experience in many developing countries makes
clear.3 0
Implementation of non-adversarial compliance systems
whereby corporations act fairly and openly in host environments is a
significant way to support background institutions in developing
countries.
The relationship between business and society is recognized in
the U.N. Global Compact, announced by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 1999 and
formally launched in July 2000, which is based upon a recognition of
the vital role that businesses can play in dealing with social and
environmental problems.3 1
Among the benefits suggested for
business are "a greater chance of a stable and harmonious

23.
See Peter
Eigen,
About
TI, Transparency International, at
http://www.transparency.org/about-ti/index.html.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
See
United
Nations,
The
Global
Compact,
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (for the principles and work of the United Nations in
offering the Global Compact as a standard for business behavior). There may also be a
dimension related to responsibility for the individual flourishing of those who work for
the corporation. For an argument along these lines, see Caryn L. Beck-Dudley &
Steven H. Hanks, On Virtue and Peace: Creating a Workplace Where People Can
Flourish, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427 (2003). See also Frances E. Zollers & Elletta
Sangrey Callahan, Workplace Violence and Security: Are There Lessons For
Peacemaking?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (2003) (discussing how inattention to
individual flourishing can result in workplace violence).
30.
See supra note 29.
31.
See
United
Nations,
The
Global
Compact:
Overview,
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org.

2003]

CORPORA TE HYPERGOALS

atmosphere in which to do business" and the long-term benefit of a
32
more stable and peaceful society in which investments can prosper.
Business thus has the power to strengthen or weaken the
essential foundations for commercial activity.
Rationally, all
businesses need to maintain these critical elements for their
operation. Those who free ride on the actions of others run the real
risk of contributing to a dynamic that may cause the background
institutions to ultimately fail or be weakened in such a way as to
place the system at risk. Because these pillars are independent of all
other factors, all businesses, wherever located and whatever their
commercial objectives, need to support them. Thus a rational case
can be made for support of the pillars as a hypergoal of for-profit
public business firms.
Any rational case will limit the identification of hypergoals to
those factors for which a plausible empirical case can be made
concerning their role as essential foundations for efficient business
interaction. The concept of hypergoals would be strengthened and
the set of specific hypergoals likely expanded if there are also
underpinning moral grounds.
2. The Moral Argument: Deontological Positions
An "overlapping consensus '33
among recognized
moral
frameworks in support of the identification of hypergoals would
provide a second methodology for identifying specific examples. In
this Section we look to applied business ethics and consider social
contract-based analysis, along with ecumenical and stakeholder
ethical arguments. We then discuss the countervailing views of
positivist economists and Neo-Hobbesans.
a. The Social Contract Argument
Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee elaborate a social
contracts-based analysis of business ethics introducing the idea of
hypernorms. 34 Hypernorms are manifest, universal principles that
35
stand at the top of the pyramid of all ethical and moral norms.
They are based upon principles so fundamental that they establish
standards by which all other norms are to be judged. 36 In general

32.

Id.

33.

See generally JOHN RAWLs, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM (1993)

(arguing for

foundational moral principles based on agreement on principles, regardless of their
source).
34.

DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 3.

35.
36.

Id. at 49-81.
Id. at 43-44.
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terms they should be discernible in a convergence of religious,
political, and philosophical thought. 37 In their book Ties that Bind,
Donaldson and Dunfee identify a series of indicators available to help
existence of hypernorms in the context of a
managers determine the
38
given ethical decision.
Donaldson and Dunfee describe at some length a hypernorm of
necessary social efficiency. 39 This hypernorm identifies duties to
maintain the efficiency of societal systems at a level essential to
provide critical social goods necessary to meet minimal needs for
These duties apply to
health, food, housing, and education. 40
obligation to act in
of
the
The basis
business organizations.
to
the
rational case made
similar
conformity with this hypernorm is
the background
to
support
need
above that business organizations
for
environment
nurturing
institutions securing the pillars of a
toward
specific
point
should
business. The analysis of hypernorms
hypergoals. For example, the obligation to act consistently with the
hypernorm of necessary social efficiency would indicate the existence
of a hypergoal that all businesses need to aspire to reduce the supply
side for corruption. Similarly, it would require that a firm act to
reduce violence and conflict.
A plausible case can be made for a hypernorm relating to
respecting human well-being. 4 1 This may have implications for
internal goals of corporations that should aspire to minimize their
potential for human harm. An example of an action inconsistent with
this hypergoal would be diverting to developing countries tires whose
safety is questioned in industrialized countries, on the assumption
that the weaker regulatory framework of the developing country
would be less likely to identify or effectively sanction the sale of
dangerous products. Not all hypernorms translate into hypergoals.
Only those that pertain to the basic nature and objectives of business
firms would qualify.
The clear implication of mandatory hypernorms is that all firms
must act consistently with their guidance. 42 All firms have a moral
obligation to internalize applicable hypernorms into organizational
hypergoals. Dunfee connects the two by arguing that firms should act
consistently with three basic principles in response to moral
pressures arising from the business environment. 43 The three basic

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 117-38.

40.

DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 3, at 119.

41.
See id. at 117.
42.
Id. at 46-47.
43.
See generally Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with
Morality, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (1999).
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principles, which may help to define the parameters of hypergoals,
are as follows:
1) The starting presumption is that all corporate actions must be
undertaken to maximize shareholder wealth;
2) In order to maximize shareholder wealth, managers must
anticipate and respond to existing and changing moral pressures in
their relevant markets that may pose threats to firm strategies, or
which may provide competitive opportunities;
3) Organizations must act consistently with manifest universal moral
44
norms and principles (hypernorms).

In The Ethics of International Business, Tom Donaldson
considers the implications of a social contracts-based approach for
Donaldson
global firms conducting international operations. 45
envisions a global social contract setting a minimal floor of
responsibility for all business firms. 46 Specifically, global firms have
an obligation to enhance the long-term welfare of employees and
productive
of large
the
drawbacks
minimize
consumers,
organizations, and refrain from violating minimal standards of justice
and human rights. 4 7 These obligations are defined in terms of ten
fundamental rights: freedom of physical movement, property
ownership, freedom from torture, fair trial, nondiscriminatory
treatment, physical security, freedom of speech and association,
minimal education, political participation, and subsistence. 48 Global
firms should avoid participation in the deprivation of any of these
rights. 49 In some very limited circumstances, Donaldson argues that
global firms have an obligation to protect potential victims against
deprivation of these fundamental rights by others. 50 Recognizing
limits derived from the nature and role of business, Donaldson is
unwilling to extend a duty to global corporations to aid those deprived
of any of the ten fundamental rights.51 Donaldson also recognizes
that sometimes variances in standards among nations may be due to
differing levels of economic development, and he is willing to accept
some lowering of ethical standards on that ground, so long as core
human rights are not violated. 52 The core obligations Donaldson
identifies should apply, where relevant, to corporations whose scope
of operations and impact cause them to fall short of global status.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 149.
See generally DONALDSON, supra note 5.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 82.
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Thus, the basic assumptions and concepts of Donaldson's approach
are consistent with the identification of specific hypergoals applicable
to all corporations wherever situated.
b. Ecumenical and Stakeholder Arguments
An approach of growing popularity among business ethicists is to
identify middle-level rules capable of serving as guideposts for multinational corporations (MNEs). These may be based in a single
theory, or more commonly, they may be based in a variety of
generally-recognized ethical theories.
Richard DeGeorge has
provided one of the most elaborate of the ecumenically grounded
middle-level approaches. 53 His guidelines are directed at U.S.-based
multinationals regarding their dealings within less-developed
countries. 54 DeGeorge seeks a realistic middle ground between the
absolutist Righteous American who inflexibly always follows her
home country norms and the Naive Immoralist who is willing to
accept any type of practice so long as there is evidence that "everyone
is doing it. '' 55 In response, DeGeorge offers seven illustrative rules for
behavior. 56
DeGeorge bases the principles upon an ecumenical
foundation, using several ethical theories-something that is
apparent from even a cursory glance at the principles: 57 (1) Do no
intentional direct harm; (2) Produce more good than harm for the
host country; (3) Contribute to the host country's development; (4)
Respect the human rights of employees; (5) To the extent that local
culture does not violate ethical norms, MNEs should respect the local
culture and work with and not against it; (6) MNEs should pay their
fair share of taxes; and (7) Cooperate with local governments in
58
developing and enforcing just background institutions.
As with Donaldson's moral minimums, DeGeorge's rules are
probably overbroad if considered as ipso facto corporate hypergoals.
Not all of DeGeorge's illustrative rules would necessarily translate
into corporate hypergoals. For example, contributing to the host
country's development may not be a plausible concept for all publiclyheld, for-profit corporations.
Such a goal may be beyond the
resources and competencies of small firms based in developing
countries. However, DeGeorge's basic approach recognizes a domain
of obligations or principles toward which all firms should aspire.
Both DeGeorge and Donaldson identify norms that there are

53.

See generally DEGEORGE, supra note 4.

54.
55.
56
57
58.

Id. at 42-45.
Id. at 15-19.
Id. at 46-58.
Id.
Id.
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compelling reasons for firms to respect. Further, they both make it
clear that they are not descriptive of a status quo already firmly
reflected in corporate behavior.5 9 Thus, the well respected innovative
approaches advanced by Donaldson and DeGeorge support the
identification of hypergoals.
An important recent advance in moral analysis of organizations
The most
is the concept of businesses as "global citizens."
comprehensive elaboration of this idea is by Jeanne M. Logsdon and
Donna J. Wood, who develop a detailed account of business as a
global citizen 60 working step by step, from the idea of individual local
citizenship, to a conception of business citizenship and global
communities, to, ultimately, the concept of business citizenship.
Applying familiar sources such as the U.N. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, they propose, for example, that all businesses have a
moral duty to support the conditions under which human rights can
be exercised. 6 1 Logsdon and Wood base their argument on both moral
and rational grounds, arguing that "[b]usiness citizenship is 6 a2
necessity for the survival and health of the business institution,"
and even that it is "essential for the sustainability of capitalism
itself."'6 3 They connect the idea of business citizenship to hypernorms
and it appears abundantly clear that their approach is entirely
consistent with one founded upon identification of hypergoals.
The stakeholder concept is an important dimension of most
The term stakeholder
Western approaches to business ethics.
identifies those who have a "stake" or an interest in the decisions of
an organization.6 4 Definitions vary, but the essence of the idea is
that those who may be significantly affected by an organization's
action, or who are at risk as a result of the decision, have a "stake" in
that decision. 65 Typical listings of stakeholders include, among
others, consumers; users; bystanders; government agencies at the
66
federal, state, and local levels; suppliers; creditors; and distributors.
More recent writings also include those internal to the firm, such as
employees, shareholders, and even senior managers.6 7 An important
task for business ethicists is to define the nature and extent of

59.

See DE GEORGE, supra note 4, at 26-33; DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 30-43.
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See R. EDWARD FREEMAN,
64.
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stakeholder interests that organizations have an obligation to
recognize in their decision-making.
On first impression, stakeholder analysis may seem inconsistent
with the identification of hypergoals because its approach is
constituency specific. Stakeholder groups are often in opposition with
each other, as is the case with the conflicting demands made by
animal rights groups and AIDS activists on pharmaceutical firms
conducting medical research involving the use of animals. The very
plurality and diversity of stakeholder groups and interests seems to
cut against the idea that a set of universal goals applicable to all
business firms can be identified. We, however, believe that such a
view of stakeholder analysis is too narrow. When one shifts the level
of analysis from the specific decision to the overall goals of a firm,
stakeholder management is capable of focusing on broader, more
universal goals consistent with the identification of hypergoals. In
1999, a team of ethicists developed a set of principles known as the
Clarkson
Center
Principles
of
Stakeholder
Management
(Principles). 68 They are addressed to managers of corporations of all
types and locations, and are designed to be consistent with the
''organizational structure and purpose of the modern business
enterprise. 69
Although many of the seven principles are
procedurally oriented and quite general (e.g., No. 3: Managers should
adopt processes and modes of behavior that are sensitive to the
concerns and capabilities of each stakeholder constituency), some are
consistent with the idea of hypergoals (e.g., No. 6: Managers should
avoid altogether activities that might jeopardize inalienable human
rights or give rise to risks which, if clearly understood, would be
patently unacceptable to relevant stakeholders). 70
Thus, when
properly focused, stakeholder analysis is consistent with the concept
of hypergoals.
3. The Moral Argument: Naturalist/Aspirational Considerations
Naturalist ethicists offer complementary analyses supporting the
idea of foundational principles. An important difference between the
naturalist/aspirational approaches and those of duty-based theories is
that the aspirational model considers the "why be ethical" argument
differently. Whereas a deontological approach considers the nature of
moral obligation from a perspective of reasoned principles or

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 257.

70.
Id. For an application of stakeholder theory to issues of violence,
particularly that of the experience of Cantor Fitzgerald after September 11, 2001 see

Tara Radin, 700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate Citizenship, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 619 (2003).
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consensual agreement that human beings ought to act in a certain
way, or both, the aspirational approach suggests that the basis lies in
Naturalists suggest that 72a
a dimension of human nature.
71
and perhaps moral,
fundamental interest in at least social,
behavior is rooted in human nature. This interest in goodness is
often obscured under certain prevailing notions in economic 73 and
political 74 theory where human nature is assumed to be oriented
toward a narrow sense of self-interest. The naturalist/aspirational
approach involves articulating positive interests of human beings
whereby theorists tap into a desire for moral goodness that is natural,
authentic, and inspiring. 75 It recognizes a natural enthusiasm for
wanting to perform moral acts. 76 This position is complementary to,
rather than opposed to, prescriptive ethics because the inspired
person must then learn what she should do to satisfy her normative
interests. In this sense, peace becomes a bootstrap: by articulating it
as a desirable goal, people can be inspired to more-deeply consider
their moral obligations necessary to achieve that goal. In doing so,
the naturalist/aspirational position also suggests that other
characteristics of human nature need be taken into account in order
to reinforce the inspirational corporation.
For example, Timothy Fort offers the notion of Business as
are viewed as
Mediating Institution, whereby businesses
communities in their own right, and yet, are truly communities only
when they are sufficiently small so that individuals within them have
77
a sense of personal relationship with the others in the organization.
Such mediating institutions ought to be generally free to develop
norms appropriate for their small communities and, in fact, Fort
argues that for individual moral development to occur, there must be
significant individual engagement with the development of norms
within such a community. 78 On first impression, this seems very

See, e.g., PAUL R. LAWRENCE & NITIN NOHRIA, DRIVEN: How HUMAN
71.
NATURE SHAPES OUR CHOICES (2002).
See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993).
72.
See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
73.
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
74.

CONSTITUTION 16 (1990) (arguing that the difference in attitude between that of the
period prior to the Revolutionary War and the period after was that post-Revoluntary
War leaders believed that the government could no longer rely on individual virtue to
check behavior, and instead required reliance on a system of institutional checks and
balances).
See generally Timothy L. Fort, A Deal, a Dolphin and a Rock (Ruffin
75.
Lectures, Apr. 2002) (paper on file with authors).
Id.
76.
See generally TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS
77.
MEDIATING INSTITUTION (2001).

78.

Id. at 21-36.
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similar to the microsocial contracts envisioned by Donaldson and
Dunfee. For Fort, however, the reasons come not from a notion of
pragmatism or social contracts, although he does not reject these
contributions as inapplicable, but rather through a natural law
tradition grounded in anthropology and theology. 79
Fort also
suggests a second level of analysis drawn from natural law that
prevents mediating institutions from practicing ethically troublesome
behavior.8 0
This second level of analysis is the basis for the
recognition of hypergoals. Rather than identifying overarching goals
as constraining forces, this approach recognizes aims as quests
relevant for corporations to pursue regardless of location, line of
81
business, or form of corporate governance.
Fort argues that human nature contains within it natural
desires for certain kinds of goods. Natural law theorists such as
Finnis8 2 have used these desires as a teleological basis for moral
development. Similarly, Aristotelian businesses ethicists, such as
Robert Solomon, identify more than 20 virtues that are relevant to
83
moral business behavior.
Is peace a natural desire? Phrased otherwise, is there an innate
desire for peacemaking in the midst of conflict? Countering the
common assumption that nature is invariably competitive,
primatologist Frans DeWaal has demonstrated that peacemaking
occurs regularly among all creatures, 8 4 particularly with respect to
human beings' closest relatives, the primates. 85 DeWaal argues that

79.
80.
81.

Id. at 9.
Fort, supra note 75.
Id.

82.
83.
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Contemporary science also provides relevant insights. Most controversial is the work
of evolutionary psychologists such as Steven Pinker and Leda Cosmides who argue that
evolution has produced a human brain with separate cognitive capacities specifically
oriented to particular functions. Rather than a general purpose, problem-solving brain,
the human brain is designed to have a language function, a cheater-detection function,
and so on. While evolutionary psychologists typically do not wed neurological
functioning capabilities to moral aims out of concern for the metaphysical implication
of teleology, philosopher Larry Arnhart has done so in connecting Darwin and
Aristotle. The link is that to perfect a function of an organ or a creature is to achieve a
teleological end for that particular function or organism. It is to flourish or to function
well within the capacities one has. See generally Leda Cosmides et al., Introduction:
Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration, in THE ADAPTED MIND:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 9 (Jerome H. Barkow,
Leda Cosmides, & John Tooby eds., 1992);
STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS
(1997); LARRY ARNHART, DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT: THE BIOLOGICAL ETHICS OF

HUMAN NATURE 29 (1998).
84.
See generally NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Filippo Aureli & Frans
B.M. DeWaal eds., 2000).
85.

See generally FRANS DEWAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES (1989).
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the innate need for peaceful relations, at least among one's
community, is strong and that elaborate social rituals are established
by even the fiercest of competitors.8 6 It is not that the desire for
peace eliminates competitive instincts, but that within competition
there is an abiding desire for peace such that reconciliation is a
critically important social category for primates.8 7 As DeWaal notes,
human beings share this aim for reconciliation. 8 In an important
sense, there may well be a particularly-human need to balance
emphasis on competition with that of reconciliation.
While
competitive games and opportunities are everywhere, there is an
open question as to whether scholars and decisionmakers have
adequately recognized the human need for reconciliation. This is a
biological end to be satisfied, and by being so, raises normative
questions as to how best to go about achieving this telos.
One can plausibly argue that (1) there is a fundamental aim
among primates, including humans, for peace and reconciliation, and
(2) this aim imposes a need for socially-relevant mechanisms to
achieve that aim. In other worlds, there is a two-tiered normative
analysis inherent in nature: that pertaining to an overarching
"hypergoal," and that pertaining to a locally-relevant structure of
socially obligatory norms necessary to achieve that goal. It is this
model that we wish to describe more fully in business terms, for our
argument is that the hypergoal of peace has implications for the
relevant ways in which a firm operates and, given the potential
consequence of violence if firms do not "adapt" to this hardwired
element, survival itself may be at stake.
4. The Normative Claims: Objections
Up to this point, we have given brief summaries of relevant
approaches taken by modern business ethicists, each of which, in
some dimension or form, incorporates or espouses ideas consistent
with the identification of corporate hypergoals. We believe that the
great weight of the literature supports such an idea. However, we
should note that there are at least two categories of dissenters who
would argue against the existence or relevance, or both, of universal
principles or goals that can guide or constrain management strategy.
First, are the neo-Hobbesans such as Velasquez, who take the
realistic view that corporations cannot be expected to exercise selfrestraint in a manner inconsistent with their economic self-interest.8 9

86.
Id. at 10-18.
87.
Id. at 7.
88.
Id.
89.
Manuel Velasquez, International Business, Morality, and the Common
Good, 2 Bus. ETHICS Q. 27 (1992).
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Velasquez argues that powerful global corporations are subject
neither to a global sovereign authority nor to effective limiting power
from individual nation states. 90 As a result, the actions of global
corporations may be beyond the reach of the legal systems of states or
the effective jurisdiction of any international authority. 91 In that
environment, it is often difficult for one business actor to signal
reliability to another, so that those who breach ethical conventions
such as promise-keeping or honesty may escape any negative
reputation effects. In such a circumstance, the desire to maximize
profit and the intense pressures of competition may spur firms to
unethical behavior. Velasquez argues there is little hope for an
effective common morality for global business in the absence of some
Leviathan that can enforce its terms for moral behavior. 92 Velasquez
states the following premise:
In the absence of an international sovereign, all rational agents will
choose not to comply with the tenets of ordinary morality, when doing
so will put one at a serious competitive disadvantage, provided that
interactions are not repeated and that agents are not able to signal
93
their reliability to each other.

This view is representative of those who take a legalistic view of
morality. Morality is thought of as the product of external social
control. The only viable solution is establishment of a powerful
international authority. This is in contrast to the more-optimistic
views of human nature that assume many people try to do the right
thing and are influenced by desires relating to the respect of their
peers.
Under this more-benign view of human nature, viable
solutions include social and economic incentives and strategies
designed to maximize freedom of choice.
We do not believe that the neo-Hobbesan critique is sufficient to
counter the multiple, foundational arguments in support of the
identification of hypergoals.
The neo-Hobbesans' concerns speak
primarily to the question of whether a concept of hypergoals can ever
be successfully realized. Even taken at their strongest, they do not
constitute an argument that the ultimate purpose of hypergoals is
wrong-headed. Human nature, after all, might not be as dark as a
Hobbesian might suggest. We would also note that the widespread
existence of exemplary corporate practice is an empirical counterpoint to the Neo-Hobbesans' assumptions about likely human
behavior. 94 Moreover, the Hobbesian argument assumes a unipolar

90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 37.
92.
Id. at 36.
93.
Id.
94.
Even with the intense media attention recently given to corporate
misconduct, the vast majority of corporations act consistently with societal values and
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conception of power. 95 The contemporary world, however, consists of
multiple poles of power, not only in terms of nation-states, but in
terms of the power wielded by NGOs, consumers, the media, and
corporations themselves. The combination of these power sources
provides the room for Dunfee's argument for a "Marketplace of
Morality" where corporations must concern themselves with the
moral preferences that are embedded within a fully functioning free
96
market.
The other main potential objection to the idea of corporate
hypergoals comes from the fields of economics and finance. The
proponents of a positivist economics approach, represented by the
views of Michael Jensen, advocate a narrow objective function of
97
wealth creation to be maximized by the management of a firm.
Although rarely explicit that this concept applies to all publicly
owned, for-profit firms, such a conclusion is not only compatible with
their approach, but probably mandatory. Thus, they are essentially
advocating a hypergoal of shareholder wealth creation. The debate
then becomes not one of the validity and existence of hypergoals, but
rather what counts as hypergoal candidates. A debate has lasted for
some time between the advocates of stakeholder management and
Proponents of the positivist approach are
positivist economists.
critical of stakeholder theory, an approach they see as having roots in
98
"the politics of special interests, and managerial self-interest.
They argue that purposeful behavior in an organizational
environment requires the existence of a single-valued objective
function. 99 Otherwise, managers cannot know how to make tradeoffs
10 0
among conflicting goals and it is impossible to measure success.
Ideas such as multi-fiduciary stakeholder theory' 0 1 and various
accounting standards proposed by NGOs to measure social
responsibility, 0 2 by providing multiple objectives, confuse and
distract managers. Jensen argues for an "enlightened" principle of

expectations. Many corporations, such as Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Timberland, and
BP Amoco have been lauded for their proactive contributions to the community.
See Velasquez, supra note 89.
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Dunfee, supra note 43, at 139-43; see also Thomas W. Dunfee, The
96.
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Q. 127 (1998).
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
97.
Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 236 (2002).
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Id. at 237.
99.
Id. at 250.
100.
101.
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102.
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variety of social responsibility measures available to measure corporate responsibility).
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value maximization emphasizing a single objective function:
maximize the long-term value of the firm. 10 3 In order to achieve this,
astute managers will find it useful to apply some of the concepts from
stakeholder theory as a means of determining what critical
constituencies of the firm desire. After all, these constituencies will
ultimately play a major role in how the firm is valued. Ultimately,
the positivist approach does not directly reject the search for
hypergoal identification. Instead, it identifies one powerful candidate
for hypergoal status. The ultimate question is whether there are
others beyond shareholder wealth maximization. We believe that
there are.
5. Normative Considerations: Conclusion & Consistency with Legal
and Political Constraints
There appear to be strong moral reasons for the recognition of
hypergoals.
Whether one follows a duty-based approach or an
aspirational approach, there appear to be overarching objectives that
human beings share. By identifying them, one makes them more
concrete for decisionmakers. To the extent they are positive, these
hypergoals counteract an assumption that human beings are only
motivated by a narrowly-defined sense of self-interest. Moreover, in
identifying hypergoals, one can develop a two-tiered analysis for
corporate decisionmakers. The higher level is to make corporate
actions consistent with hypergoals and the norms that have been
demonstrably linked to that goal. The second level is to attend to the
emotions, sentiments, and interests of those stakeholders
immediately affected by corporate action. This two-tiered analysis
will be utilized in applying notions of sustainable peace to
contemporary international dilemmas, such as the conflict diamonds
case.
A concept of corporate hypergoals is not useful if it is
inconsistent with extant legal rules or political expectations. Because
at this point the scope and nature of any specific hypergoals is a black
box, the only way in which the general concept of internalized
hypergoals would be impermissible is if the legal constraints on
publicly-owned, for-profit corporations do not allow for any flexibility
in establishing goals. Milton Friedman, the best known apostle of
wealth maximization for shareholders, is equally famous among
business ethicists for his important qualification: "while conforming
to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those

103.
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embodied in ethical custom. ' 10 4 Certainly, hypergoals that reflect
manifest, documentable universal moral principles are likely to be
compatible with law. We believe that the most appropriate solution
is to note that hypergoals must, of necessity, be generally compatible
with the legal regimes in which corporations operate. Therefore, it is
sensible to, when considering the process by which hypergoals are to
be identified, consider all constraints likely to result from the legal
and political environment. As is argued elsewhere in this volume,
integrating a hypergoal of peace is something that is consistent with
10 5
extant corporate governance regimes either implicitly or explicitly.
Given the consistency of that conclusion with our position, we defer to
the argument of that paper in demonstrating the compatibility with
our analysis of strategic corporate options with extant governance
principles.
On the basis of the analysis so far, we believe that a strong case
exists for the existence of hypergoals. In the next Section we discuss
the characteristics of hypergoals.
B. The Characteristicsof Hypergoals
Hypergoals may serve as action guideposts for all publicly-held,
for-profit corporations, showing the way toward the resolution of
business decisions with moral overtones. Capability to fulfill this role
would require that hypergoals be (1) consistent with a primary
emphasis on profit-making, (2) consistent with standard corporate
governance regimes, (3) few in number, clear, and readily
measurable, and (4) goals that firms should aspire to as they evolve
as entities over time.
The basic business objective of publicly-held, for-profit
10 6
corporations is to generate wealth for their owners or shareholders.
This uncontroversial proposition holds for such corporations
throughout the world.1 07 This does not, however, mean that every
one of these organizations has an objective of generating maximized
accounting profits, particularly in the short term. Microsoft was
recently sanctioned by the SEC for accounting manipulations that
were designed to lower their profits in the short term, so that they
could "bank" earnings for future quarters to maintain the appearance

104.
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
105.
See generally Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Adapting Corporate
Governance for Sustainable Peace, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377 (2003).
106.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994).
107.
See Bradley, supra note 1, at 50-77 (discussing transnational defining of
corporate purposes in terms of profitability).
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of steady growth.1 08 Liberty Media's John Malone is notorious for
avoiding accounting profits, which are subject to taxation, and
seeking other measurements of performance that will presumably
appeal to investors.10 9
Thus, even in this supposedly objective function of a business
enterprise, there is room for interpretation and maneuver. Any
hypergoal applicable to business corporations needs to reflect this
environment and be consistent with the basic expectations of the
owners of the organization. A hypergoal emphasizing disclosure and
transparency would advance the status of shareholders and help
them to monitor whether the organization is providing value
maximization along the lines they desire.
It is unlikely that there would be a large set of identifiable
hypergoals. The need to be applicable to all publicly-held, for-profit
corporations and to fit with the diverse forms of regulation and
governance will produce only a limited set. This is consistent with
the concept of hypergoals as providing highly important, yet
mandatory, guidance for organizations to act in a manner supportive
of the essential environment for business activity.
A goal is a result that one wishes to obtain or to aspire to. 110 It
defines the mission of an organization and establishes the manner in
which performance will be measured. Jensen and others argue that
value maximization is the only proper goal for profit seeking
corporations."'i Units of an organization may have various sub-goals
designed to help the organization reach its overall primary goal or
objective. These will vary within and across organizations. The great
diversity of organizations and types of business activities will produce
an environment in which there will be a multiplicity of subsidiary
goals. Our focus is not on these smaller goals. Instead, in the prior
Section we asked whether there are general goals that are relevant to
all organizations. We concluded that the answer is yes. Goals at this
level might pertain to such things as an obligation to act with basic
transparency and to make serious efforts to reduce or eliminate
business-supported public sector corruption. A goal of that type
must be understood as something to aspire to. It would be unrealistic
to condemn any corporation that failed to achieve complete success
regarding such a goal.
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III. CANDIDATES FOR HYPERGOALS

In this Section, we discuss two candidates for hypergoals . u 2 We
do so to illustrate what a hypergoal looks like. Our focus is on the
control of violence and as a consequence, we select two potential
hypergoals: one, transparency, indirectly related to the control of
violence, and the other a direct obligation to take steps within the
core competencies of the firm to contribute to sustainable peace.
Even though the latter is quite general in its focus, we nevertheless
believe it to be sufficiently concrete to be readily identifiable, as well
as robust enough to provide guidance for corporations.
A. Transparency
The first hypergoal candidate is transparency. By transparency
we mean that an organization should report accurately and fairly all
aspects of their operations relevant to investors and other
stakeholders. The obligation to report is mitigated by considerations
of cost and legitimate proprietary interests. Firms must consider the
costs of providing information and, where it is material, may satisfy
the requirement by standing ready to provide responses to legitimate
inquiries.
Of course, firms may safeguard intellectual property
interests including trade secret protection that may be lost if certain
information is disclosed. 113 Transparency of organizational decisions
and financial reporting is widely recognized today as an aspect of
good governance." 4 Transparency is important for the effective
functioning of capital markets and it takes on particular salience in
reference to the wide spread phenomenon of bribery. n 5
Major transnational organizations, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, have made transparency a
central criterion for governmental as well as corporate practices,

112.
There are many other potential candidates, e.g., contributing to a
sustainable environment. However, our purpose here is not to develop a full set of
hypergoals, but instead, to focus on the concept as relevant to the mitigation of
violence.
113.
Costs and intellectual property interests must not be used as a smokescreen, an easy excuse to justify policies that are in fact counter to the spirit of
transparency.
114.
See Eigen, supra note 23. Calls for the goal, of course, have increased since
the 2002 corporate misbehavior.
115.
See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption:A Principled
Approach: The C2 Principles (CombatingCorruption),33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593 (2000).
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primarily as a way to root out corruption. 116 One of the many
in
problems of bribery is that it erodes the participation of citizens 117
government, favoring instead those who can buy access to power.
The dysfunction this creates can lead to coups. 1 1 8 A recent study
showed a direct correlation between corruption and violence. 119 That
study took as a benchmark the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index and matched it against the Heidelberg
Index, which categorizes how conflicts are resolved in specific
countries. 120 The study found that countries that were the most
transparent resolved conflicts by violence only 14 percent of the time
while those that were the most corrupt resolved conflicts by violence
60 percent of the time. 121 The linkage between corruption and
violence may not be causative; it could be that corruption leads to
poverty and poverty in turn leads to violence. It is worth noting that
this linkage is not intended to suggest that corruption leads to
today. It is,
terrorism, a form of violence of particular concern
122
however, suggestive of generic forms of violence.
Why would corrupt countries be more prone to violence? 123 A

Miguel Scholoss, Luncheon Address at the Symposium on Fighting
116.
InternationalCorruption & Bribery in the 21-1 Century, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 469, 478
(2000).
117.
See Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational
Intrusion,33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 632-33 (2000).
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118.
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Id.
120.
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121.
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twenty-six percent of the time and those in the third quadrant resolved disputes by
violent means forty-four percent of the time.
There is a complex relationship between poverty and the terrorists who
122.
take advantage of that poverty to pursue the aims and tactics that they select. A
wealthy, well-educated terrorist may, for instance, not feel the poverty of a given
population, but needs to exploit the desperation of such poverty in order to pursue his
own aims. It is for this reason that some foreign policy analysts, such as Strobe Talbot,
talk about attacking terrorism by attacking poverty not so much in order to prevent a
bin Laden from existing, but in order to "drain the swamp" where a bin Laden can find
sanctuary to pursue his objectives. Strobe Talbot, The Other Evil, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 75.
Cf. Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change,
123.
and Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 658, 661 (2000) (warning that
extraterritorial attempts to impose anti-corruption laws can themselves be viewed as
an intrusion that could flame emotions); Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Globalization, Asian
Values, and Economic Reform: The Impact of Tradition and Change on Ethical Values
in Chinese Business, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 711, 726 (2000) (echoing Salbu's concern at
least insofar as extraterritorial extension of anti-bribery laws could be viewed as an
exercise of U.S. hegemony).

2003J

CORPORA TE HYPERGOALS

key reason may be that corruption thrives on secrecy. 124 Secrecy
prevents public evaluation and discussion over whether the behavior
of individuals in positions of authority, whether governmental or
corporate, is legitimate. 125 This leads to the second criterion: voice.
Voice is the reciprocal component of transparency. Those who
receive the information about the organization's operations need to
have some means of acting upon it. Indeed, as already noted, this is a
key component of functioning democracies and functioning
democracies have been tied to reduced violence. 126 Not only do
citizens have a say in the rules that govern them, which promotes a
sense of legitimacy to the rules themselves, but where many different
people have voice, a premium is placed on how to take into account
those voices through negotiation and compromise-traits that lead to
nonviolent resolution of disputes. 12 7 Two additional analogies help
bolster this point.
The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen, has studied
the incidences
of famine
and has concluded,
somewhat
controversially, that famines simply do not occur in countries
governed by a functioning democracy. 128 In his view, the reason for
famine is not the lack of food, but rather the lack of voice by those
who are hungry and with that lack of voice, an ability to influence the
political decisions that lead to the distribution of food. 129 Voice thus
becomes a critical element in the alleviation of extreme forms of
poverty because it violates a basic notion of justice in the form of
participation-a factor related not only to macroeconomic issues of
famine, but which has also been tied to dimensions of corporate
governance as well. 130 Sen's claim expands the ethical criterion of

124.

Hess & Dunfee, supra note 115, at 597-98.

125.
DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 3, at 226-30.
126.
See generally SPENCER R. WEART, NEVER AT WAR: WHY DEMOCRACIES WILL
NOT FIGHT ONE ANOTHER (1998) (arguing that well-established democracies have

never warred with each other).
127.
Id. at 15.
128.
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 178 (1999).
129.
Id. at 180-81.
130.
See CONNIE PECK, SUSTAINABLE PEACE: THE ROLE OF THE UN AND
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PREVENTING CONFLICT 17 (1998); see also FINNIS, supra

note 83, at 147 (arguing that a basic sense of justice in natural law is the participation
in the rules that govern an individual); see also DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 3,
at 163-64 (likewise arguing that voice in terms of participation in the development of a
social contract is a key component of justice). In addition to these macroeconomic
notions, there are reasons to believe that the institutionalization of voice in the form of
strong employee rights, such as through employee stock ownership, could also be a
guarantor of voice and promote its advantages. See Dana Muir, Employee Profit
Sharing, Voice, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2003). More controversial,
perhaps, is an additional argument that shows that gender voice is particularly
important; that is, that the voice of women in organizations tends to be associated with
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voice beyond the values and traditions underpinning Western
liberalism. Instead, voice is justified as a key criterion for good
action.
This idea is further supported by anthropological research.
David Fabbro has conducted research on the traits of peaceful
societies. 13 1 Among the attributes of such societies are egalitarian
social structures where social control is achieved through group
consensus. 132 Obviously, decisions made on the basis of group
consensus require a sense of voice by all the members of the society.
Here, too, the fact that this finding comes from robust anthropological
data suggests something deeply rooted in our human nature that is
ethically important in a universal sense, and not grounded solely in
western, liberal, democratic values.
Ultimately, corruption interferes with the efficient and fair
operation of government entities, while at the same time it distorts
the operation of capital and consumer markets. In the process, it
weakens the capacity of the background institutions essential to
autonomous business enterprise and strikes at their very
legitimacy.133

B. Contributingto SustainablePeace
To this point, we have suggested repeatedly that peace is a
potential hypergoal. We have not described what sustainable peace
is, nor have we linked corporate behavior to the achievement of it.
This Section attempts to do so. The argument proceeds as follows.
First, we define sustainable peace. Second, we describe the potential
corporate role in achieving sustainable peace. Although sustainable

less violent behavior. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, Gender Voice
and CorrelationsWith Peace, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527 (2003).

131.
David Fabbro, Peaceful Societies: An Introduction, 15 J. PEACE STUD. 67
(1978).
132.
Id.
133.
Transparency's status as a hypergoal further derives from two factors.
First, as the discussion suggests, there is a duty-based justification for it. That is,
transparency is an overarching good that one should practice because it tends to
eliminate or at least mitigate various harms associated with secrecy. Because of its
breadth, it can be characterized as a hypergood. Second, one can view transparency as
an instrumental hypernorm necessary to achieve an aspirational hypergood of
sustainable peace.
That is, transparency leads to a good of peace. Moreover,
transparency is based on a rooted interest in honesty. While human beings undeniably
have an enormous capacity for deception, it is important to parallel that capacity with
a desire for truth-telling as well. Lie detector tests, for instance, are based on the
evidence that shows that deception produces biological stress. One can claim an
aspirational dimension, therefore, for openness and honesty that accords with an
aspect of human nature. Thus, both duty-based and aspirational elements support the
notion of transparency as a hypergoal.
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peace may also have duty-based arguments establishing it as a
hypergoal, the following discussion assesses it from a more
aspirational perspective.
1. Defining Sustainable Peace
A term like sustainable peace evokes a positive consideration of
peace as related to the practicing of justice, but like its environmental
cousin, sustainable development, the term is open to a variety of
interpretations. Some degree of open-endedness is valuable because
flexibility allows for adjustments based on specific circumstances of
historical times and places. We focus on the primary attributes of a
state of peace: the absence of organized violence and an ongoing
sense of stability.13 4 A longing for a lasting peace may well be an
innate psychological desire of all human beings. An examination of
the poetry, art, and music of cultures around the world reinforces the
perception that peace is desired.
Indeed, it may be the most
Poets and
compelling existential end articulated by humanity.
religions long for it, 135 composers attempt to create it, 136 and even
13 7
military strategists can build armies in order to achieve it.
In her book Sustainable Peace, Connie Peck, assessing
governmental and regional governmental associations that can
contribute to peace, describes sustainable peace as involving
[tihe institutionalization of participatory processes in order to provide
civil and political rights to all peoples. It requires adequate legal
enforcement and judicial protection to ensure that all citizens are
treated equally and fairly and that their human rights are safeguarded.
It involves equitable economic development and opportunities so that

134.
The means by which peace is obtained are relevant. One way to create an
ongoing sense of stability and lack of violence is, as Tacitus said about the Roman
conquest of Carthage, to create a desert and call it peace. Certainly, it is true that if
one eradicates a population and its environment the likelihood of future violence by
nonexistent parties is low. Another way is for a population to be so completely
controlled, repressed, and oppressed that there is no opportunity for any kind of dissent
or opposition. Thus, the satellite countries of the former Soviet Union experienced
relative stability for an extended period of time, but at the cost of economic
opportunity, religious freedom, and other basic rights. These notions of sustainable
peace are based on the unrestrained and unconstrained exercise of power, a system
fraught with moral peril. The employment of these strategies does not fit within our
definition of sustainable peace.
135.
See APPROACHES TO PEACE: A READER IN PEACE STUDIES (David P. Barash
ed., 2000) (providing an interesting compilation of various poetic and religious odes to
peace).
136.
Composers writing requiems typically attempt to musically reenact as
sense of peace.
137.
See, e.g., MICHAEL I. HANDEL, MASTERS OF WAR: CLASSICAL STRATEGIC
THOUGHT 22 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the Chinese general Sun Tzu theory of preparing
for war in order to avoid it).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

590

[VOL. 36.563

economic and social rights can be provided. Finally, it entails the
development of pluralistic norms and practices that respect the unique
cultures and identities of all. Sustainable peace also requires education
of dominant groups to convince them that their own long-term security
138
interests lie in the development of a just society.

In short, Peck argues that sustainable peace exists when there is a
sense of justice that includes participation, equal treatment, human
139
rights, economic opportunity, education, and respect for diversity.
To phrase it differently, sustainable peace requires the establishment
of the norms advanced by the deontological theorists of social
contracts, stakeholder theory, citizenship, and pragmatism. The telos
of peace provides the psychological aspiration for why these norms
are desirable. It is not only that institutions should be just, but that
by being just, less bloodshed occurs. Within the reality that nationstates will certainly contend for power, a commitment to these moral
principles provides an important counterweight, so that when
stability is created, it is created on the basis of justice. Sustainable
peace thus becomes a peace of justice.
2. Corporate Dimensions of Sustainable Peace
That corporations can play an important role concerning
sustainable peace is not necessarily intuitive. Those who argue that
"the business of business is business" would conclude that the task of
This view seems
achieving sustainable peace is up to states.
supported by the realist view of international relations, particularly
the realpolitik balance of power theory. Under the realist theory of
international relations, states are the principle actors on the world
scene and they are driven to expand their power as much as possible
until checked by some other power. 140 Peace results from a balancing
of powers so that the possession of power by strong states is in
equilibrium so that conflicts, when they arise, can be limited and
resolved by the parties who are part of that balance of power. 141 A
classic example of this was the Concert of Europe, which dominated
European affairs for nearly 100 years prior to the outbreak of World
War 1.142

Yet, the history of the Concert of Europe shows that more was at
stake than consideration for the expansion of national power. The
balance of power system became unstable when a moral dimension

138.
139.

PECK, supra note 130, at 45.
See id.

140.

See DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE PRESERVATION OF

PEACE 1-7 (1995).
141.
Id. at 6-7.
See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 94-105 (1994).
142.
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was removed from it and replaced by the naked ambition of each
In Kissinger's analysis, for example, an important
state. 143
dimension of what held the Concert of Europe together was a moral
sense of solidarity between Russia and Austria-Hungary as offspring
of the Holy Roman Empire. 144 This solidarity muted the innate
competition that the two countries felt over Balkan areas-Serbia in
particular-were ethnically related to the Russians, but were the
prime alternative for the geopolitical expansion of AustriaHungary. 145 When Russia and Austria-Hungary abandoned their
commitment to solidarity and replaced it with a more-realist notion of
questing for power, Kissinger argues that it was simply a matter of
time before the Balkans became a flashpoint that shifting alliances
could not accommodate. 146 In fact, in such a zero-sum competition,
what was more important than shifting alliances were enduring ones
that could be called upon in time of war.
There are three features of Kissinger's analysis salient for
understanding a realist definition of sustainable peace. First, it is
instructive that Kissinger, who is as prominent a balance-of-power
theorist as one is likely to find, sees a moral commitment as an
essential underpinning of the Concert of Europe. This should provide
reasons for those who are skeptical about the relative values of moral
claims in the rough and tumble world of politics (as well as
economics) to recognize the importance of moral claims. Second,
without passing judgment on the relative quality of having solidarity
as "children" of the Holy Roman Empire, moral claims may be a
necessary part of balance of power stability. This has implications for
the free market. It is often assumed in the heuristic of "purely
competitive markets" that freely-functioning markets self-correct.
Self-interested behavior, therefore, is both efficient and fair in a
utilitarian sense because it produces more wealth. Yet the Concert of
Europe analogy demonstrates that relying entirely on organizations
to provide stable balances on the basis of self-interest runs significant
risks. Thus, moral aspiration can be a helpful dimension to balance of
power equations. Third, the Kissinger assessment of the Concert of
Europe opens the door to the analysis of what moral claims are, in
fact, most beneficial to a global system. The balance of power
framework has also been augmented by a fourth approach to
international relations: the neo-realist school.
The neo-realist school considers the state to be the primary actor
on the world stage, but it also recognizes that states are interested in

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.

Id.
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the protection of the security needs of their populations. 14 7 Such
needs include not only security from invasion, but also basic needs of
food and shelter as well as psychological needs of cultural or national
identity. 148 These needs are more open to analysis of how disputes
are resolved and how societies are organized. For instance, one does
not get to a psychologically-satisfying experience of peace by living in
Tacitus's desert or the Soviet Union's Gulag. One might find a
psychologically-appealing state of stability in a dependable balance of
power, but as we have seen, balances of power may flourish best
when a moral end is incorporated. As we argue, infra, corporations
may play a significant role in encouraging the inclusion of moral
values compatible with markets and freedom in decision-making.
Peck's analysis, as explained in Part III.B.1, has two potential
limitations for corporate life. First, she addresses governmental
rather that corporate governance. Second, her arguments could be
characterized as western-oriented and therefore may be subject to
concerns whether these really are universal characteristics that
would sustain peace. This Article suggests, however, that these
potential limitations do not ultimately ripen into problems that
prevent
applying
principles
along
the
lines
of Peck's
recommendations to the evaluation of corporate strategy.
One reason is that there are likely spillover effects from
corporate governance to cultural ways of resolving problems. This
can occur in three ways. For example, Jane Jacobs has argued that
political beliefs can be sorted into two piles. 149 In the first pile are
values of respecting hierarchy, obedience, discipline, and taking
vengeance and deceiving rivals. 15 0 In the other pile are collaboration
with strangers, striking voluntary agreements, respecting contracts,
and shunning force. 151 Jacobs and others have argued that where
commerce is strong, republican political culture is also more likely to
be found. 152 Thus, to the extent there is a commercial culture reliant
on negotiation, compromise, and contracts, there is a predicate for the
building of a political culture that values these traits.
The second reason builds directly on the first reason. In his
study on why democracies do not war with one another, Spencer
Weart concludes that governmental leaders typically utilize the

147.

See, e.g.,

Herbert

C.

Kelman,

Social-Psychological Dimensions of

International Conflict, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND

TECHNIQUES, at 191 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997).
148.
Id.
149.
JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL:
FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCE AND POLITICS (1992).

150.

Id.

151.

Id.

152.

WEART, supra note 126, at 82.
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strategies to resolve problems abroad that they do at home. 153 Weart
writes that
it is an established fact that the behavior a state's leaders practice at
home tends to be reflected in their diplomatic actions abroad. The old
liberal saw that republicans generally behave more peacefully toward
other nations than do autocrats has been confirmed about as reliable as
15 4
anything can be in statistical studies of human communities.

In addition to the notion that commerce leads to the kinds of traits
that are likely to support dispute resolution based on principled
discussion is the notion that a commerce-driven culture is likely to
lead to a political culture, which itself is more likely to approach
disputes internationally in a less violent way.
Admittedly, we are painting with a large brush, but the work of
Jacobs and Weart does point to general trends worth noting. They
suggest that corporations' behavior can have spillover effects in the
culture in which they operate. 155 There is a final way this may occur,
although the evidence to support it is more speculative and anecdotal
than the studies conducted by Jacobs and Weart. The third reason is
that corporations can, in fact, demonstrate the efficacy of voice. In
countries without a tradition of democratic governance, the relative
power of corporations in such countries may be sufficient to influence
the development of democratic traits, which have been linked to
reduced amounts of violence. 156 Contemporary management theory,
after all, does not exclusively rely on a stereotypical "command-andcontrol" model.
Instead, corporations, such as Motorola, use
employee voice as a key competitive advantage to improve quality
workplace processes. 157 Thus, employees and those watching the
companies' actions can see a voice-based model of governance that
may influence the development of democratic principles more
generally.
As a result, while there is a difference between political and
corporate governance, the methods used by political officials and
corporate leaders are more intertwined than one might think. If
corporate action does influence political culture, and if that political
culture is tied to reduction of violence, then corporate governance
practices are relevant to the sustainability of peace.
Perhaps in implicit recognition of the arguments given there is a
growing understanding that corporations have the capacity to do

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
See id. at 87-90.
See generally id.

157.
See GEORGE ECKES, THE SIX SIGMA REVOLUTION: How GENERAL ELECTRIC
AND OTHERS TURNED PROCESS INTO PROFITS 1-11 (2000) (emphasizing quality

processes involving management at every level of the organization).
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something about problems of violence. Since 1989, the vast majority
of violent conflicts have occurred within existing borders rather than
across them. 158 Corporations have the capacity to do something
about problems of violence because of their power and influence,
particularly in emerging economies. 159 Even if corporate leaders do
not view their responsibility as contributing to peace, they are
responsible legally for protecting employees and business assets from
violence that, as has been painfully demonstrated, may be quite
foreseeable.160
A side benefit of peace is security; from the
perspective of protection of shareholder value, corporate leaders have
a strong reason to expand strategies contributing to sustainable
peace.
The reasons for corporations to take into account the impact of
business decisions on peaceful relations go beyond a mere legal
compliance dimension. In keeping with our earlier reference to the
importance of incorporating aspirational quests in addition to
compliance rules, we suggest that the aim of peace is strong enough
to be deeply motivational to leaders and employees. This should be
particularly true if senior managers become convinced that they can
take steps likely to lessen the amount of bloodshed in the world,
thereby making business enterprise more sustainable by ensuring
grounds of stability.
What are possible corporate contributions to sustainable peace?
An article in this symposium issue specifies four ways in which
corporations can contribute to sustainable peace. 16 1 They include (1)
providing economic development, (2) being open to external
evaluation of corporate actions through the promotion of
transparency principles as well as supporting the rule of law,
including protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts,
(3) nourishing a sense of community both between the corporation
and its host country as well as within the corporation itself, and (4)
engaging in track-two diplomacy both in the sense of assisting
conflicting nation-states to work out their differences as well as
building positive images of one's home nation by good corporate
citizenship. 162 Given this agenda for corporate action, there are

158.
R. SCOTT APPLEBY, THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE SACRED: RELIGION,
VIOLENCE, AND RECONCILIATION 17 (2000).
159.
See Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 549 (2002).
160.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 119.
161.
Id.

162.

See Joseph Montville, Transnationalism and the Role of Track-Two

Diplomacy, in APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECTUAL MAP 262 (W. Scott Thompson
& Kenneth M. Jenson eds., 1992) (defining track-two diplomacy as the "unofficial,
informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of
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clearly a significant number of possible corporate contributions to
foster sustainable peace. For purposes of our discussion and in the
interests of space, we will assume that corporations make a
contribution to peace through economic development in many ways.
The narrow definition of track-two diplomacy-the unofficial dialogue
among members of conflicting nation-states that sets the stage for
more collaborative negotiations and relationships between those
states 1 63-is important, but beyond the scope of the strategic choices
we envision with respect to the management of a business
organization. The remaining dimensions of this four-part agenda can
be characterized as issues of corporate citizenship, something that
foreign policy leaders, such as the U.S. Secretary of State, have
164
recognized as critically important.

developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material
resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict").
163.
Id.
164.
The 2002 criteria for the Secretary of State's Award for Corporate
Excellence were:
*

Maintaining good corporate citizenship by engaging in ethical business
practices, maintaining the integrity of the company, and dealing with
consumers in accordance with fair business practices.

"

Displaying exemplary employment practices and a fair opportunity for trade
unions to represent employees as well as avoiding discrimination based on
race, gender or ethnicity.

*

Creating a healthy workplace environment for all workers. This includes
working for the effective abolition of child labor and forced labor practices
as well as maintaining a working environment equal to, if not exceeding,
comparable local industry standards of health and safety.

*

Conducting business with an astute consciousness of local, national, and
global environmental concerns. This includes the collection and ongoing
monitoring of useful information regarding the environmental, health, and
social impacts of operations. Also, working with local, national, and
international officials to adequately communicate to the public regarding
potential environmental and health issues without compromising the
business's integrity and ability to operate successfully.

*

Contributing to the overall growth and development both economically and
socially of the local society. This includes work-specific skills training,
general academic improvement, and opportunities for personal selfimprovement, as well as other programs, services and philanthropic
endeavors for the local public, all aimed at providing a base for growing and
sustaining an increased quality of life.

*

Endeavoring to ensure that business activities are compatible with the
science and technology policies of the countries and, as appropriate,
contribute to the development of local innovative capacity.

*

Developing and maintaining a healthy respect for the local, national, and
international authority. This includes rejecting the practices of bribery,
extortion, illegal tax exemption, and favoritism in favor of creating a fair
and open marketplace beneficial to all.
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For instance, Rayonier received the Secretary of State's Award
for Corporate Excellence in 2000, primarily for its attention to
employee development and the needs of indigenous Maori peoples. 16 5
F.C. Shaffer won the Award in 1999 for its work in Ethiopia, where it
shared its knowledge in building sugar refineries with competitors
after a devastating flood ripped through the country. 166 SELCO
Vietnam was a 2001 winner for supplying electricity to families who
lacked access to a power grid, 167 and Ford Motor Company won the
same year for its extensive HIV-AIDS education and treatment
program in South Africa. 168
These firms, along with other
winners, 169 contributed to their communities while also providing
economic development and adherence to local, national, and
170
international law.
The Award for Corporate Excellence criteria and the winners of
the award exemplify the sense of a positive interface with a
community by respecting the humanity and talents of those working
for the company and by seeking to eliminate suffering and providing
positive opportunities for the wider community of which the
companies were a part. One can fairly describe this criteria and these
companies as aspirationally emblematic of corporate citizenship
because, as citizens, they (1) conformed to relevant laws, (2)
performed their role as economic engines of development, and (3) did
so in a way that is constructive rather than exploitative. Moreover,
these companies practice important elements of Peck's identification
of the kind of participatory contribution stakeholders make to the
governance of an organization. Corporations consider the interests of
the stakeholders so important that they proactively address them. In
a more subtle way, the practices of a company committed to quality,
such as Motorola, teach the importance of voice as an essential aspect
of Peck's method of creating participatory governance mechanisms
that contribute to sustainable peace.
At this point we have (1) inquired as to the possibility of the
existence of hypergoals broadly applicable to corporations, (2)

U.S. Dep't of State, Secretary of State's Award for Corporate Excellence: Selection
Process and Criteriafor 2002, at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace/2002/14279.htm.
165.
Press Release, Embassy of the United States of America, South Africa, U.S.
Department of State Award for Corporate Excellence (Jan. 16, 2002), at
http://usembassy.state.gov/pretoria/wwwhpr3u.html.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. (listing Xerox do Brasil as the 1999 winner, and listing Motorola
Malaysia and Frigorifico Canelones as winners in 2000).
170.
Lorne W. Craner, Remarks to the Business for Social Responsibility
Conference, Privatizing Human Rights: The Roles of Govenrment, Civil Society and
Corporations (Nov. 8, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/6684.htm.
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presented rational instrumental and moral arguments in support of
the concept, and (3) suggested candidate hypergoals of transparency
and sustainable peace. We now turn to explore how for-profit,
publicly-owned global corporations engaged in transnational
transactions can implement a hypergoal of sustainable peace. We
focus on this set of firms because most violence and conflicts have
transnational dimensions and because firms that operate in that
environment have the greatest potential for making an impact. 171 In
the next Section, we will discuss the basic strategies available to
global corporations when they encounter issues in transnational
activities involving cultural conflicts.

IV. STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH CULTURAL CONFLICTS

Up to this point we have discussed corporate contributions to
sustainable peace in very general terms. We have noted that
corporations can have an important impact through (1) job creation
and general contributions to economic production, (2) living and
promoting transparency, (3) acting as a good citizen in home and host
communities, and (4) in certain circumstances, by engaging in track172
two diplomacy.
In order to understand how corporations approach decisions with
implications for sustainable peace, we begin with a brief discussion of
how firms generally manage their ethics strategies. Ethics programs
are now ubiquitous in corporate America and provide an opportunity
for developed statements of corporate goals, including those
supporting the hypergoal of sustainable peace. 173 Currently, few

171.
Domestic firms, particularly those located in strife-torn communities, may
also have a major impact on the resolution of conflicts. Their situations are likely to be
more sui generis. Nonetheless, they should contribute to sustainable peace within their
capacities and circumstances.
172.
Perhaps the most significant contribution that many corporations can make
is to monitor and modify their actions that have a direct tie to actual or potential
violence, which are sometimes called zones of conflict. Such decisions range from
buying or distributing goods or services involving coerced or slave labor, supporting
those who employ violence in return for economic favors, and providing goods and
materials that enable others to engage in violence. The international trade in weapons
is a major ingredient in the level of violence that exists today. Merely complying with
laws pertaining to "trading with the enemy" is not sufficient; firms should take steps to
determine the ultimate destination of weapons and military material, and should have
in place policies defining their role in seeking to mitigate global conflicts. This itself is
an important application of the concept of a corporate contribution to sustainable
peace. This Article touches on this in conjunction with the analysis of conflict
diamonds, but recognizes that there are additional, specialized dimensions to corporate
activities in zones of conflict. The United Nations has a specialized focus on such areas
as part of its Global Compact.
See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
173.
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firms state formally their overall orientation for ethical decisionmaking, so it is necessary to imply their strategic orientation from
their policies and the manner in which their corporate ethics
programs are organized. Ultimately, we will show that the type of
ethics programs and policies that a firm has signals how the firm is,
or is not, implementing strategies consistent with sustainable
17 4
peace.

The overall philosophy underpinning an organization's ethics
program may be signaled by language in a parental or unified code.
One key difference is the important distinction between ethics
programs that are compliance-based and those that are integritybased. 175 The former are essentially internal social control systems
based upon external standards, typically home nation laws. 176 They

174.
While the rise of NGOs and the pressure they can apply to corporate
reputation is significant, perhaps a more compelling reason for corporations to adopt
ethics programs is the 1991 Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). To
simplify a great deal, the Guidelines' approach is to reduce the fine otherwise
applicable to a violation of federal law if a corporation has adopted an "effective"
program. Elements of an effective program include a clear code of conduct, mission
statement, or values statement; the appointment of a high-level executive to oversee
the program; education of employees as to the dimensions of the program; a "safe"
place (such as an ombudsperson office) to register complaints about unethical behavior;
and self-reporting of violations to government authorities. Policies need to be perceived
to apply to top management as well as to rank-and-file employees, and companies need
to have well-designed training sessions in order for the programs to be part of
corporate culture.
Firms vary their ethics programs in significant ways. Often the foundation of an
ethics program is a formal code of ethics. Most major U.S. and European-based
companies now have individualized, comprehensive ethics codes. Corporate codes often
serve as a constitution for their ethics programs by providing a basic foundation while
at the same time laying out core structural and procedural components. Codes can be
quite diverse and managers have a great deal of choice as to how to design a code for
their own organization. (Managers who want an "off the shelf" ethics code are
considered to be not serious about the value of such codes. To be effective, codes must
reflect the values, culture, and history of the organization.) One key dimension for
large, global corporations relates to the scope or jurisdiction of the code. Firms may
have a centralized, single code that applies to all units of the organization. Centralized
codes are typically based in the parent unit and imposed in a top down manner on the
other units of the overall organization. In contrast to the centralized approach are
operating unit-based codes. A firm taking this approach would have a different code
for each foreign subsidiary or other subunits of the firm. The multiple code approach is
more likely when foreign subsidiaries are treated essentially as national firms in the
environments in which they operate; or where there are certain issues, such as gender
equity, concerning which it is difficult to build a consensus across diverse subunits of
the organization. In some cases the firm may only have local codes. In other cases, the
parent may have a more general code while subunits have their own separate codes.
This is likely to create federalism issues where questions arise as to whether the
parent organization code or the local code should be applied to a given decision.
175.
See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for OrganizationalIntegrity, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106.
176.
See id. at 109-10.
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are more likely to involve lawyers in their design and operation.
Their principles are often more specific, sometimes supplemented by
references to legal restrictions.
In contrast, integrity-based
approaches are focused on values internal to the firm. 177 The
principles may be very general, sometimes expressed as a credo. The
values underling the principles expressed derive from the firm's
history and culture. Non-lawyer executives are more likely to be
involved in the formulation of the code, even very senior
management. These descriptions represent the extremes that are
possible across firms. In fact, many firms have programs that reflect
178
elements of both types.
A. A Descriptive Typology of CorporateStrategy
How then may firms manage specific decisions relevant to the
hypergoal of sustainable peace? We will approach this question by
suggesting a framework that can help us understand alternative
strategies available to firms in dealing with the hard cases resulting
from cultural conflicts in global transactions. The framework is
designed to allow classification of the basic or most-fundamental
options; it is not intended to be all-inclusive or comprehensively
descriptive. Clearly there are other options and some firms may
combine strategies in a wide variety of ways. Our purpose here is a
more limited one of discussing the implications of the alternatives
and showing how they fit into a two-tiered approach to business
ethics.
The categories are Corporate Imperialist, Corporate
Chameleon, Corporate Nationalist, and Corporate Opportunist. 179 A
comparison of the four categories is provided in Table 1.

177.

See id. at 111-12.

178.
The design of a formal ethics program can also vary. A growing number of
U.S. firms have ethics officers. Ideally an ethics officer is a senior executive who has
direct access to the Chief Executive Officer, and if necessary, to the Board of Directors.
Some have relatively large staffs and run extensive training programs, help lines and
services and may even participate in critical decisions. The relative power of the ethics
officer signals the approach of the firm to resolving cultural conflicts. Does, for
example, the ethics officer have authority over or lines to foreign units of the
organization?
Or, instead, do the foreign units have separate practice officers
responsible for the decisions within that unit? Answers to these and similar questions
determine the extent to which the ethics program is centralized and unified.
179.
Others have proposed models of the ethical approaches of global
corporations.
Enderle has proposed a framework involving four types: Foreign
Country, Empire, Interconnection, and Global. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note
3, at 217-19.
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Table 1
Corporate Decision Types in Managing Across Cultures
Type
Imperialist
Citicorp,
Nike

Chameleon
Shell, United
Technologies

Nationalist
Honda,
AT&T,
Renault

Opportunist
Texaco,
Northrup,
Huntingdon
Life Sciences

Decision
rule

Source of
Values

Code

Ethics
Program

Flag

Ethical
Orientation

apply own
ethical value
everywhere

internal,
from
company
culture and
history

corporate
level, unjifed
specific

integrity
oriented,
centralized,
strong ethics
officer

company

ethical
absolutist

adopt ethical
values from
host
enviroments

norms and
customs of
host
environments

decentralized
code,
separate
subsidiary

business
practice
officers at
each
subsidiary

host country
for each
subsidiary

ethical
relativist

adopt values
of home
country for
decisions
everywhere

laws and
customs of
home country

reference to
home
country laws

compliance
oriented

home
country

ethical
absolutist

any source
enhancing
profits

general,
focused on
performance
goals

if any,
results
oriented
goals

many flags
(including
pirate)
depends on
context

ethical egoist

maximize
firm's
profits,
stategic use
of ethics to
enhance
Iprofits

The Corporate Imperialist tends to be admired by business
ethicists. Corporate Imperialists operate on the basis of a very strong
and clear set of organizational values. Their values are internally
derived and focused, and often will have been developed with primary
reference to the history and culture of the firm. Most importantly,
the employees will ordinarily buy into these organizational values so
that they become widely accepted norms throughout the organization,
including all global subsidiaries. For U.S. and leading European
firms, these values are likely to be reflected in a unified or single
headquarters level code.1 8 0 In U.S. firms there is an ever-increasing
likelihood that there will be a formal ethics program headed by a
senior executive designated by the title of ethics officer. 181 However,
a formal code or ethics program is not an absolute requirement for
qualifying as a Corporate Imperialist. There are clearly other means
by which organizational values can be established and supported
throughout an organization.
Non-code, non-program based
approaches would presumably be more likely for global firms with
headquarters in Europe and South America, and even more for global
firms based in Asia.

180.

NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 84.

181.

Id.
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The fundamental decision principle employed by the Corporate
Imperialist is to apply its own values and principles everywhere the
company does business. The company's values are to dominate and
trump all conflicting customs and norms.
Within the strong
Corporate Imperialist organization, this decision principle would be
stressed in employee training, and it might be imagined as always
flying the corporate flag (e.g., the Nike swoosh) wherever it does
business. A strong Corporate Imperialist would rely on its own
policies in deciding whether to respond to bribe solicitations, and
would follow its own rules about gender discrimination to the letter.
The ethics program would be integrity-based and would likely be
managed outside the legal department. The program would be highly
centralized and the foreign operating units would be under the
18 2
overall jurisdiction of the parent's corporate ethics managers.
The second alternative is the Corporate Chameleon.
The
tendency of these firms is to follow local norms and customs, which
will generally be considered to dominate or trump home office policies
or any universal standards. They do not merely respect local customs
and traditions; they fully adopt and internalize them in their foreign
operations. If they operate subsidiaries, they tend to see these as
local firms within the host environment. Thus, a European Corporate
Chameleon would view its Japanese subsidiary as a Japanese firm.
The Corporate Chameleons can be recognized by the fact that they
tend to have sub-codes for regional or national subsidiaries. They
may also have corporate practice officers assigned to each subsidiary
with full responsibility for matters involving ethical standards and
practices. Similar to the Corporate Imperialists, firms acting as
Corporate Chameleons take a strong, consistent position concerning
ethical standards. But they differ at a key point-the Chameleons
consistently base their standards on local practices and customs.

182.
The ethical philosophy of this approach can be characterized as one of
absolutism. Note that absolutism is not limited to any particular viewpoint. All kinds
of principles may qualify as the basis for absolutism. In its strong form, absolutism
holds that there is only one truth, only one answer, which must be followed in all
contexts. A view commonly associated with religious fundamentalists, it may also be
associated with those who believe that a certain form of political organization (popular
democracy) or economic system (shareholder capitalism) is the only viable system. The
test is whether or not one applies the principles regardless of the norms of the
community in which it is going to operate. The sole test is consistency in following the
principle. Thus, a firm that has a strong sense of its own values and takes the position
that it will follow those principles (e.g. equal opportunity, zero tolerance for sexual
harassment) wherever it does business would qualify as an absolutist firm. Absolutism
also has significant drawbacks. The idea that there is a single truth immediately leads
to questions of the identity and source of such a truth. Where many do not agree with
or understand such a truth, the result of absolutism will be to hold people to standards
with which they disagree.
It thus appears to involve an implicit coerciveness.
Absolutism may also be criticized for failing to respect diversity among cultures.
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Thus, across the Corporate Chameleon organization, there may be
substantial variances in norms and in attitudes toward certain types
of ethical issues. The norms of the local environments in which the
firm operates would become part of the overall value system of the
firm. The legacy S.G. Warburg firm1 8 3 was described by its managers
as such a firm and might be imagined of as flying its host country's
flag over each of its national subsidiaries.
A strong Corporate
Chameleon would accede to local norms in deciding whether to make
requested payments and would follow local practice in its treatment
184
of women.
The third category of firm is the Corporate Nationalist. This
approach may be thought of as a global version of what Lynn Paine

183.
Today the merged firm is UBS Warburg.
184.
The ethical philosophy for this approach would be relativism. "When in
Rome do as the Romans do." This familiar aphorism describes a clear-cut strategy
available for international business dealings. When doing business in a foreign locale,
act consistently with local customs: pay the bribe, accede to local standards on plant
safety, discriminate based on gender-if that is what local firms do. This approach is
known as relativism. Relativism is defended as respecting diversity and the moral
autonomy of other humans. The relativist will argue: "Who am I to judge what is
correct behavior for another?" "One should always respect the values of other
cultures." "It is ethical imperialism and therefore wrong for one society to try to
impose its values on other societies."
On the other hand, there are very powerful arguments against relativism. If the
policy is followed without exception, so that any local practice is considered
appropriate, then relativism becomes counter-intuitive to most people. There are some
things, such as killing for economic gain or cannibalism, which are considered wrong by
almost everyone. James Q. Wilson attributes this to an innate moral sense possessed
by almost all humans. It helps explain, among other things, why lie detectors work on
most people. Perhaps influenced by an innate moral conscience, many people are
unwilling to accept relativism as a generally-applicable principle. Instead they draw a
line. It is hard to imagine a firm accepting a requirement that they sacrifice the life of
one of their managers in order to obtain a license to do business in another culture if
that was the bizarre local practice.
Relativism is also criticized as being an illogical ethical theory. Relativism appears
to deny individuals and groups the opportunity to be universalists by believing in and
acting consistently with conceptions of universal values. It provides no answer to what
to do if one is doing business in a culture of universalists. In that case, the relativist
would seem to have no option other than to abandon relativism.
Relativism also fails to provide any basis for resolving conflicts between social
groups when there is an interaction among them, as in trade among cultures with
mutually exclusive values. If a transaction simultaneously involves more than one
community, and those communities have directly conflicting values, what does one do?
Perhaps the greatest problem with relativism comes from what it represents. It
constitutes moral abdication, the surrendering of the ability to make any moral
judgments concerning the actions of others. The true relativist must accept slavery,
human sacrifice, cannibalism or any other practice that represents a genuine norm
within a social group. That is why very few modern philosophers support the strong
form of relativism. That is not to say, however, that weaker forms of relativism are not
useful and appealing. Some managers may follow a strategy of using relativism as a
default principle. So long as there is no compelling justification for not following local
practice, the firm will acquiesce.
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has described as a compliance-oriented firm. 8 5 In her article in the
Harvard Business Review, Paine made an important distinction
between firms that follow a compliance approach to business ethics
and firms that emphasize integrity by instilling a "sense of shared
accountability among employees" 186 keyed to the organization's own
values. Firms following a compliance strategy focus on externallyimposed standards found in laws, industry codes, and outside
sources.1 8 7 In contrast, an integrity strategy is based upon selfchosen standards reflecting the company's values and aspirations and
is typically led by senior management.' 88 Corporate Nationalists
would tend to be global versions of Paine's compliance-oriented firms,
who look particularly to the laws and customs of their home country
as the primary reference point for resolving cross-cultural issues.
Upon close analysis, such firms do not have a strong individualized
culture or customized set of organizational values, but instead adopt
the values and customs of their home country. Wherever possible,
they will seek to mold the local environment in which they operate
into patterns consistent with the home culture. Certain U.S. and
Japanese firms have been perceived as taking this approach. A U.S.
firm following this strategy might be imagined as flying the Stars and
Stripes wherever it does business.
A U.S. nationalist would
presumably not give in to requests for bribes because of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, and would follow U.S. laws pertaining to
gender based discrimination.
The ethical philosophy would be
absolutism, but in this case the absolutist standards would be those
derived from the home country's laws and customs.
The final alternative, and probably by far the most common, is
the Corporate Opportunist. Such firms are the business equivalent of
the pragmatic politician. All decisions are focused toward achieving a
particular immediate or short-term goal. There is no anchor or core
set of values designed to be a first point of reference in a given
circumstance. Instead of an a priori approach to ethics, its managers
pick and choose among local customs and practices, organizational
norms, and home country values, depending on the circumstances
8 9
and which strategy appears most likely to enhance the firm's goals.'

185.
186.

Paine, supra note 175.
Id. at 11.

187.

Id.

188.
Id.
189.
This ethical approach is egoistic, prudential, and instrumental. Egoism
operates on a different plane and involves the decisionmaker acting solely in his or her
self interest. Rather than consistently following absolutist or relativist principles, the
egoist firm would always act in a manner designed to advance its own interests. At the
human level, the existence of egoism is explained by two quite different ideas. One is
that humans are driven to act selfishly by their innate natures. This idea of
psychological egoism is carried by some to the extreme conclusion that humans are
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As with the pirate ships of old, they may carry a wide variety of flags,
any one of which they will run up the pole when circumstances are
ripe.
Although some firms taking this approach may have a
consistent decision-making matrix for deciding which flag they will
hoist, it seems plausible that many firms basically approach such
issues on an ad hoc basis. Thus, a U.S.-based global drug company
with research operations in the United Kingdom and Singapore may
take a different approach to its policies regarding use of animals in
research in response to the strong and vociferous animal rights
movement in the United Kingdom. They might follow looser policies
concerning the treatment of animals in their facility in Singapore
where the animal rights movement is relatively mute. On the other
hand, if the management of that same Corporate Opportunist
believes they will have a more productive workforce by applying the
same human resources policies concerning leaves and benefits across
all subsidiaries, they will do so even in the face of greatly differing
practices (for example, France versus the United States). If they find
that not following U.S. law concerning gender discrimination will
lower wage costs in South American operations, they will ignore the
U.S. policies.

incapable of acting in any other way. This is at best a highly controversial empirical
claim. As noted in the discussion of relativism, there are many who make the opposite
claim: that humans possess an innate moral sense reflected in the persistence of
altruistic behaviors and the fact that physiological changes occur when many people
act immorally.
The second basis for egoism is the argument that everyone will be better off if
people act solely in their own self-interest. Individuals need each other, so people will
often work to satisfy the desires of others as a means of achieving their own goals. In
doing so, people will work harder and presumably with greater success than under any
other regime. The assumption is that the aggregation of this effort will make everyone
better off when measured by the satisfaction of individual desires. This, too, is a very
controversial argument. It ignores externalities and would only seem to be operational
in a state of anarchy in which there are no forms of government. Power and guile
would likely be dominant factors in such an environment.
At the corporate level, if organizations act solely in furtherance of an objective
function such as wealth maximization for shareholders, is that the equivalent of
egoism? The answer would appear to be yes. Such a corporation would evaluate each
decision in terms of its impact on the organization and would act inconsistently on
other measures, sometimes following local standards, sometimes following home
standards, depending on which approach is most likely to advance the interests of the
firm. The egoistic corporation would act in a manner similar to a Kohlberg stage two
human. Laws would be followed only when it was in the interests of the firm to do so.
Calculations would be made of the likelihood of being caught and the likely penalty in
deciding whether to abide by legal principles. A strategy of efficient breach would be
followed in regard to promises and contracts. Contracts would be honored unless there
would be more to gain from dishonoring the contract. The egoistic corporation would
not follow a consistent policy of relativism or of absolutism based on some defined set of
moral values.
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Before leaving an entirely negative impression of the Corporate
Opportunist, we should note that a far more benign view might be
appropriate. 190 One explanation for Corporate Opportunist behavior
is that those firms' managers might be seeking a sensible middle
ground between the extreme absolutist and extreme relativist
positions reflected in the other alternatives. True, they are picking
and choosing their policies to fit specific situations, but they are doing
so as a means to avoid the criticisms of extreme relativist or
This alternative, we will suggest, can be
absolutist positions.
legitimated by the two-tiered approach of the Adapted Firm.
These four alternatives are presented primarily as a framework
for assessing the basic options for managing cultural conflicts.
Although there may be only a few companies classifiable as a pure
version of any one of the types, it seems reasonable to expect that
many companies fall generally into one of the classifications. As a
means of demonstrating the application of the frameworks, we will
consider how they apply to the current issue involving the
distribution and sale of so called "bloody" or "conflict" diamonds. We
select this example because the relationship between this product and
violence is direct and documented. The capacity to commit violence
on the part of those who initially traffic in these jewels is highly
dependent upon actions by a number of private firms operating
within well-established markets.
B. Demonstratingthe Decision Frameworks: The Case of Conflict
Diamonds
Conflict diamonds are extracted primarily from Sierra Leone,
Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo by terrorist
military units fighting the recognized, legitimate governments in
those nations. 191 The terrorist units use the funds from the sale of
conflict diamonds to purchase weapons and other materials essential
for carrying on their violent campaigns. 192 The importation of conflict
diamonds into the United States has been widely criticized by human
rights groups such as Amnesty International, and legislation
constraining importation has been introduced into the U.S.

190.
Note that the Corporate Opportunist is not a utilitarian. To qualify, the
firm would have to be making the best decision from the viewpoint of all affected. The
Corporate Opportunist is only acting in its own best interest. Further, if the firm were
indeed seeking to achieve positive utilitarian outcomes, it would be a Corporate
Imperialist in that it is seeking to apply its preferred values wherever it does business.
Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds, at 1-2, at http://www.globalwitness.org/
191.
campaigns/diamonds/downloads/conflict.pdf.
192.
Id.
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Congress. 193 The human rights abuses of groups tied to conflict
diamonds, such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra
Leone, have been documented. 194 The RUF coerces children and
young teenagers into their fighting forces. 195 The RUF has abducted
women and children and used them in forced labor, as sex slaves, and
196
as child soldiers.
DeBeers, a South African company, dominates the diamond
trade. 197 For many years, DeBeers engaged in a supply-side strategy
that emphasized limiting the number of quality diamonds available
for sale in order to maintain high prices. 19 8 Over time their market
share declined as new producers from Russia, Canada, and Australia
operated outside of DeBeers' controlled channels. 199 At the beginning
of the 21st Century, DeBeers dissolved the Central Selling
Organization that it controlled. 200 Its new demand-side strategy was
able to draw upon their existing slogan, "A Diamond is Forever," to
increase consumer interest in diamonds. 20 1 Human rights groups
have countered with advertising of their own. Amnesty International
has a television ad that features the song "Diamonds are a Girl's Best
Friend" in which it alternates beatific images of models wearing
diamonds with grisly pictures of amputees and other victims of
African violence sponsored by conflict diamonds. 20 2 DeBeers admits
that it traded in conflict diamonds prior to 1999, although its
managers claimed to be unaware of the source of the diamonds
20 3
during that period.
The retail end of the diamond market is critical to the entire
channel of distribution. Consumers can boycott if they are concerned

193.
Clean Diamond Trade Act, H.R. Con. Res. 410, 109th Cong. (2002)
(encouraging the United Nations to sanction diamonds from the Congo); Clean
Diamond Trade Act, H.R. 2722, 107th Cong., § 5 (2001) (empowering the President to
prohibit importation if there is "credible evidence that such polished diamonds and
jewelry were produced with conflict diamonds").
194.
See, e.g., U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Sierra LeoneUNAMSIL Background, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm.
195.
U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sierra Leone:
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2000,at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlsl
hrrpt/2000/afI 755.htm.
196.

Rod MacJohnson, Amputation Terror Grips Sierra Leone, AGENCE FRANCE-

PRESSE, May 13, 1998, availableat 1998 WL 2280411.
197.
Nicholas Stein, The DeBeers Story: A New Cut on an Old Monopoly,
FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 186-206.
198.
Id. at 190-91.
199.
Id. at 192.
200.
The Changing Face of Diamonds, EDMONTON J., June 1, 2001, at F3; see
Stein, supra note 197, at 196.
201.
See Stein, supranote 198, at 195-96.
202.
News Advisory, NGOs Call for an End to Diamond Bloodshed on
Valentine's Day, US NEWSWIRE, February 12, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 4139876.
Eugenie Samuel, Diamond Wars, NEW SCIENTIST, May 25, 2002, at 6.
203.
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that their actions are in some way contributing to human rights
abuses. 20 4 Concerned about negative reactions, high end retailer
Tiffany & Company has a two-page letter available to consumers
stating their zero-tolerance policy toward conflict diamonds and
explaining how they have been actively involved with industry groups
prevent conflict
in seeking ways to mark the source of diamonds20to
5
diamonds from entering the streams of commerce.
In between mining and the retail market are the steps in which
the gems are cut and polished and then sold to retailers. Belgium
(Antwerp) is a major wholesale point where a substantial majority of
the world's diamonds passes through. 20 6 Distributors have a problem
identifying the source of diamonds with certainty as purveyors of
conflict diamonds have every incentive to conceal their derivation. A
technical fix has proved elusive because the science required to
identify the source of all diamonds would be labor-intensive and very
expensive. 20 7 Nonetheless, efforts continue and may ultimately bear
fruit. 208 Non-scientific approaches to identifying diamonds include
the Kimberley Protocol, due to be implemented in January 2003, that
20 9
requires a certificate of origin to accompany all diamonds.
DeBeers supports the Protocol and efforts to make sure that such
that
certificates cannot be altered or forged. Even so, many believe
210
certificates are and will continue to be forged and manipulated.
We now offer some opinions regarding how some of the major
players might fit within the framework of corporate decision types.
These opinions are based upon general news stories concerning the
actions of the parties, and in many cases the failure of the parties to
offer explanations for their actions. Essentially, we look for evidence
that the parties fit or, more often, do not fit the criteria defining a
particular decision type. A full and fair characterization for each of
the parties would require a much more detailed investigation of their
actions and motives. We offer these tentative opinions as a starting
point for a discussion of the role played by the key parties. They

See Francesco Guerrera & Andrew Parker, DeBeers to Seek Guaranteesover
204.
'Rebel Diamonds': Mining Giant Responds to Global Criticism and Demands Buyers'
Pledges that they do not Deal in Stones Smuggled, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at 1.
Letter from Tiffany & Co., Conflict Diamonds: We Want You to Know (copy
205.
on file with authors).
David Buchan et al., The Deadly Scramble for Diamonds in Africa, FIN.
206.
TIMES, July 10, 2000, at 6.

207.
Researchers Develop Methods to Characterize Diamonds, ASCRIBE
NEWSWIRE, May 31, 2002, available at LEXIS, Newsgroup File, Most Recent Two
Years.
See Samuel, supra note 203.
208.
209.
DeBeers, Leading the Way in Tackling Conflict Diamonds, at
http://www.debeers.com/html/corp-resp/leading.html.
210.
Samuel, supra note 203.
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represent how a case could be built for a formal placement into the
framework.
DeBeers is the major player in this drama. We show how
DeBeers might be shown initially to fit the criteria for a Corporate
Opportunist and then evolve into a present status as a Corporate
Nationalist.
Critics charge that DeBeers initially engaged in
strategies of willful ignorance and conscious disregard by failing to
take steps that would identify the source of diamonds that they
trade. 211 Only when multiple sources of outside pressure targeted
DeBeers did they implement some changes in how they acquire and
distribute diamonds. 2 12
By the time that they responded, the
pressures were almost overwhelming. Tensions built up as a result of
fiery speeches and proposed legislation in the U.S. Congress, a
conference on conflict diamonds sponsored by President Clinton,
actions by the United Nations, and reports from NGOs such as Global
Watch and Amnesty International. 213 DeBeers appears not to have
disclosed a clear corporate policy on this issue during the time period
in which the issue was coming to global notice, nor do they appear at
that time to have been following an expressed policy of the nation of
South Africa. Among other factors, the legitimate sales from South
Africa, an important source of revenue for the nation, would appear to
be endangered by a failure to resolve this festering issue. In order to
be a Corporate Chameleon, DeBeers would have to have been
adjusting its policies on the basis of local norms. On the issue of
conflict diamonds, that is hard to determine. For example, there is no
clear evidence that DeBeers varied its policy consistently through a
process in which it attempted to determine the existence of local
norms and then systematically brought its policies into line with
them. Evidence of such actions would be required in order to
determine that DeBeers was acting as a relativist. Lacking evidence
that it was acting as a Corporate Chameleon or a Corporate
Nationalist, the failure of the firm to have a clear cut "imperialist"
policy would seem to relegate them to the status of a Corporate
Opportunist. This characterization takes on even greater relevancy
in the face of charges that DeBeers has used the conflict to its
advantage. As described in the Africa News,
After initially being defensive about the issue of conflict diamonds,
DeBeers came to see the advantage of it. With its monopolistic hold on
the world supply of diamonds slipping by about 20 percent in recent

211.
212.
213.

See id.
Id.
Id.
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years, here was a way of regaining control and decreasing the supply of
2 14
rough diamonds, or at least socially acceptable ones.

The article argues that DeBeers' strategy of branding diamonds as
conflict-free is a cynical ploy to capitalize on the conflict.
Today, DeBeers and its marketing subsidiary emphasize on their
web pages that the "trade in conflicts diamonds is unquestionably
small"2 15 and accounts "for only 3% of all diamonds being
produced. '216 Despite these comments, it appears that DeBeers has
been a strong supporter of the Government of South Africa's efforts
reflected in the Kimberley Process. DeBeers describes its efforts as
being in parallel with the South African Government. 2 17 These
actions are more consistent with the characterization of a Corporate
Nationalist.
The actions of the wholesalers in Antwerp are secretive, thereby
limiting our ability to discuss particular firms and actions. Although
we cannot know with certainty how to characterize them, a
circumstantial case can be developed that they have been acting as
Corporate Nationalists. The community is known to be extremely
close-knit, working on the basis of personal contacts. They have little
visibility at the retail level where consumers might be concerned
about their practices. Any impact on them as a result of public
disapproval of conflict diamonds is likely to be indirect. Therefore
they have little incentive to disclose their policies in a public way.
Instead, their focus is on those with whom they deal with directly as
sellers and buyers in the channel of distribution. It is in the interest
of their industry and also of Belgium to maximize the flow of
diamonds through their centers, regardless of the source of the
diamonds. To the extent that they act in a coordinated manner,
following their own industry or national norms, they are acting in the
manner of a Corporate Nationalist. They seek to sustain these
policies to the greatest extent possible against all outside pressures.
The sources of their standards are the norms found among their
colleagues; that is to say that they are not derived internally by each
of the firms.
Finally, there are the retailers who sell the finished diamonds to
ultimate consumers. Tiffany & Company is a prime example. Tiffany
is in the same position as universities and others that may purchase
clothing and other items from manufacturers to which they then
attach their own trademarks. In that way, the goods and any human

214.
Conflict and Security; Conflict Diamondsare Forever, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 8,
2002, Lexis, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years.
215.
DeBeers, Hot Topic: Conflict Diamonds, Introduction, at http://www.
debeersgroup.com/hotTopics/cdlntroduction.asp [hereinafter DeBeers, Hot Topic].
216.
DeBeers, supra note 209.
217.
See DeBeers, Hot Topic, supranote 215.
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rights violations associated with them may become in turn associated
with the retailer. Tiffany states that it has a firm policy that
prohibits doing any business with any entity associated with conflict
diamonds. 2 18
They state that the policy has been implemented
through notifications to all suppliers. 219 In support of their policy,
they have advocated legislation and have been involved with the
industry group established to deal with conflict diamonds, the World
Diamond Council. 2 20 This combination of activities, based on selfcharacterization, appears consistent with the approach of a Corporate
Imperialist. Regardless of the norms and positions of other groups,
they follow their own internally derived policy. They have a single,
unitary policy that does not vary by location or circumstance.
Further, they work to impose the policies on others, even their
industry colleagues.
Whether this tentative characterization is
sustainable depends ultimately upon the reality of their efforts.
Among other things, recent charges that their outlets in the United
Kingdom are ignorant of the Kimberley Process would have to be
22 1
found to be groundless.
Each of the strategies identified via this example have serious
drawbacks. DeBeers and the wholesalers underweight moral issues.
Tiffany and other Corporate Imperialists may fail to consider nuances
of local variances and may be out of tune with norms of important
stakeholders, who may fear that the actions taken may harm
legitimate diamond mining in poor African countries. In the next
Section we consider the possibility of another option: the Adapted
Firm.
C. The Adapted Firm: The Difference the Hypergoal of PeaceMakes
An adapted creature or organism is one that has developed in
order to be able to survive. What promotes survival, as biologists and
primatologists now consistently demonstrate, is a combination of raw
competitiveness with genuine cooperation extruding sentiments of
affection, empathy, and solidarity. 2 22 If corporations can play a role
in contributing to sustainable peace, they not only do something that
is admirable, they also take steps to ensure their own survival. An

218.
See Bob Dart, Congressman: Know Crisis of Diamond Before You Buy,
PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 3, 2000, at 31A.
219.
Id.
220.
See Lynn Duke, Diamond Trade's Tragic Flaw, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2001,
at H01.
221.
Stuart Wallace, UK Jewelers "Ignorant"of New Diamond Accord, Charity
Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 28, 2002, availableat Lexis, News Library, Allbbn File.
222.
See, e.g., FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG
IN HUMAN AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996).
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Adapted Firm would be one that not only is profit-seeking and
flexible as the Opportunist or the Chameleon would be; it is also
attentive to critical identity issues as is the Nationalist, and it would
be concerned with issues of global sustainability as is the righteous
Imperialist. An Adapted Firm, however, is not simply adapted in a
happy confluence of the positive features of all the other models we
2 23
have presented.
The Adapted Firm flourishes because it has a two-tiered
approach to resolving corporate dilemmas. The two tiers can be
described as (1) policies focused on local issues and values, and (2)
more strategic, generalized values encompassing manifest, universal
moral principles, such as an overarching quest to contribute to
sustainable peace. This type of strategic orientation adapts the firm
toward survival by limiting threats to the very existence of the firm
that can result from violence. This quest, as we have argued, is not
grounded in deontology, but in aspiration. As such, it is free of
arguments that there is any imposition of values. By consenting to
this quest, however, firms become subject to empirical indicators of
what local practices lead to, or way from, peace. As such, norms such
as economic development, openness to external evaluation
(transparency and rule of law), and engagement in proactive
citizenship (including strengthening the voice of internal and external
stakeholders) become obligatory.
Table II expands the set of corporate decisionmakers by
highlighting the Adapted Firm as a decision type.

223.
As tempting as it is for academics to do exactly that in proposing the
models they wish to champion, a second lesson of evolution is that there are
evolutionary principles of natural selection working at many different levels-and
therefore there is similarity in how various levels evolve-but they also work
differently and at different levels. For example, a "seeing mechanism" may develop as
an eye under the pressure of natural selection just as an ape evolves subject to the
forces of natural selection, but one cannot simply conflate the evolution of the ape with
the evolution of the seeing mechanism. See David Sloan Wilson, Altruism and
Organism: Disentangling the Themes of Multilevel Selection Theory, 150 AM.
NATURALIST S122 (Supp. 1997); see also, Fort, supra note 76 (arguing that multilevel
selection theory is a tool to be used in corporate ethics by distinguishing between
approaches that encourage positive sentiments and those that rely on contractual
exchange). For an example of the difference a goal of peace makes to contractual
negotiations, see George Siedel, The Role of Business Deal Making and Dispute
Resolution Processes in Contributing to Sustainable Peace, Presentation at 2002
William Davidson Institute Conference, Corporate Governance and Sustainable Peace
(Nov. 22-24, 2002).
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Table 2
The Adapted Firm as a Corporate Decision Type
Type
Imperialist
Citicorp,
Nike

Chameleon
Shell, United
Technologies

Nationalist
Honda,
AT&T,
Renault

Opportunist
Texaco,
Northrup,
Huntingdon
Life Sciences

Adapted
Levi Strauss

Decision
rule

Source of
Values

Code

Ethics
Program

Flag

Ethical
Orientation

apply own
ethical value
everywhere

internal,
from
company
culture and
history

corporate
level, unjifed
specific

integrity
oriented,
centralized,
strong ethics
officer

company

ethical
absolutist

adopt ethical
values from
host
enviroments

norms and
customs of
host
environments

decentralized
code,
separate
subsidiary

business
practice
officers at
each
subsidiary

host country
for each
subsidiary

ethical
relativist

adopt values
of home
country for
decisions
everywhere

laws and
customs of
home country

reference to
home
country laws

compliance
oriented

home
country

ethical
absolutist

maximize
firm's
profits,
stategic use
of ethics to
enhance
profits

any source
enhancing
profits

general,
focused on
performance
goals

if any,
results
oriented
goals

many flags
(including
pirate)
depends on
context

ethical egoist

profitmaking
consistent
with
relevant
marketplace
morality and
universal
norms

firm, local
communities
and manifest
universals

local norms
and manifest
universals
integrated
into overall
corporate
code

integrity
oriented,
strong ethics
offier, role
for
subsidiaries

U.N.,
national,
host,
corporate

contractarian

The Adapted Firm also adapts to survive by its relations with the
local community. It does not fight with violence in the abstract, but
with particular adversaries in the concrete. One might characterize
this immediate confrontation as a short-term reality. While a
commitment to sustainable peace is a hypergoal, one has to survive
the short-term to get to that hypergoal. Because we have framed this
in naturalistic terms, the naturalistic concept of multilevel selection
theory can help to illustrate the point.
Multilevel Selection Theory suggests that there are different
mechanisms of analysis appropriate for different levels. This can be
applied to a philosophy of corporate governance as well. As Fort has
argued, it is important for corporations to have small communities
within the business so as to draw upon and nourish innate moral
sentiments in a group small enough for individuals to see
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224
consequences of actions and rationalize sentiments into principles.
As Donaldson and Dunfee have argued, extant social contracts within
communities and nations may be authentic provided there is an
opportunity for members of that community to exit the community
and to have voice in the rules that affect them. These authentic
norms are leavened by hypernorms; the manifest, universal moral
principles that apply to all firms and contexts. 225 These two levels
leave open a great deal of freedom for individuals to develop norms
that affect them. On the local level of moral analysis, the salient
features of good governance are flexibility, authenticity, voice, and
psychological benefits of solidarity, support, empathy, and affection.
Fostering these sentiments leads to an immediate short-term
increase in the likelihood of reduced violence. A corporation attentive
to these traits embraces solidarity with the local population.
Yet, the executive of an Adapted Firm must also know that these
features, worthy as they are, also can lead to tribalism or relativism;
ultimately these negative characteristics can undermine not only the
sustainability of the firm (if it becomes a target of popular unrest) but
of greater, even global, society as well. Thus, in addition to moral
sentiments, there is a need for hypernorms to constrain destructive
behavior. 226 We have argued that what prevents such a constraint
from being an imposition of alien restraints is the extent to which it is
justified by a hypergoal of peace, which links a powerful moral
sentiment to a set of behaviors that make the ideal of sustainable
peace into a reality. A hypergoal cannot be an imposition because it
relies on a consensual agreement that peace is a universal aspiration.
A hypergoal is based on an agreement of what people want to do.
Once there is agreement on what people want to do-i.e., live in peace
and survive-then there is a basis for legitimizing the obligations
necessary in order to achieve this telos. Hence, an Adapted Firm is
obedient to hypernorms through an aspirational quest for peace in
the interests of its own survival and that of others as well. It does so
by implementing those practices that have been linked to sustainable
peace: economic development, openness to external evaluation, and
citizenship.
Ultimately, we argue that the hypergoal of sustainable peace is
better supported by the tactical decisions of thousands of Adapted
Firms rather than by the grand strategic policies of a few. A tipping
point is likely to be reached when a substantial percentage of firms
that have some direct connection to a dimension of sustainable act as
Adapted Firms. The Adapted Firm as we have described it (1)

224.
225.
226.

Fort, supra note 75.
DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 3, at 44-47.
Id. at 49-81.
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considers peace to be a universal objective, (2) acts as a global citizen,
(3) acts transparently, (4) supports and nurtures the rule of law, (5)
properly balances financial goals with sustainable peace, and (6)
broadens its definitions of stakeholders to include victims of violence.
In reference to the specific issue of conflict diamonds an Adapted
Firm would act as follows:
(1) operates under a core principle that it will not handle diamonds
unless it can make a confident business judgment that they are not
conflict derived;
(2) implements principle 1 as a firm policy and not merely to satisfy
immediate concerns of ultimate consumers, NGOs and governmental
entities;
(3) exercises influence on direct suppliers and distributors to get
them to avoid conflict diamonds even when dealing with others;
(4) supports industry norms that will result in principle 1 being
followed throughout the channels of distribution for gems;
(5) discloses fully all
diamonds; and,

policies

and actions

related to conflict

(6) cooperates with relevant actions of NGOs and governmental
entities.

Moreover, evaluating how firms engage in such strategies
demonstrate the precise place at which the four models of corporate
strategy-Opportunist, Chameleon, Nationalist, and Imperialist-fall
short. Ultimately, each of them is focused primarily either at a global
or at a local level. This two-tiered approach will tend to produce four
kinds of corporate decisions:
(1) Defer to local norms-no implications for hypergoals;
(2)

Local norms are in conflict with hypergoals requiring deference to
hypergoals;

(3)

Local norms are in conflict with hypergoals requiring some
sacrifice of hypergoals in the short-term, but linked to a
subsequent obligation to prevent similar dilemmas from
reoccurring; and
(4) Norms that lead to hypergoal of peace are themselves in conflict
with each other, requiring the exercise of practical judgment to
evaluate the priority of the most relevant norm.

In the case of conflict diamonds, the RUF represents a source of local
norms which, as we have seen, justify use of murder, enslavement,
torture, and child labor as a means of accomplishing its goals. If a
multinational organization simply wished to default to such
problematic local norms, it would be a Chameleon. It is not difficult
to demonstrate that defaulting to RUF-derived norms violates most of
the tenets of what corporations should do to contribute to sustainable
peace. In particular, dealing either directly or indirectly with the
RUF would lack openness to external evaluation measures such as
transparency and support of the rule of law. It would be inconsistent
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with notions of good corporate citizenship. In this case, it would seem
that, particularly for a luxury good such as diamonds, there would be
no justification for following local customs, and that corporate
behavior should, therefore, fundamentally and radically change.
The actions of the Corporate Opportunist, a category that may
well explain the strategies of many multinationals, shares many of
the problems of the Chameleon. DeBeers, described as initially an
Opportunist, demonstrates the limits of this strategy. DeBeers, for a
long time, was not open to external evaluation. In fact, its lack of
transparency is one of the ways it has been able to distance itself
from the consequences of its actions. And to the extent it is profiting
from RUF actions, DeBeers disrespects the rule of law. Likewise,
there is little evidence clearly demonstrating that DeBeers is using
227
its corporate presence as a constructive citizen.
On the other hand, DeBeers might claim that it is fostering
economic development, and that its efforts in that sphere
counterbalance any shortcomings in other areas. DeBeers does create
jobs, which are probably the most important economic contribution
that a multinational corporation can make to a home or host country.
DeBeers has also been directly involved in the effort to increase black
financial ownership in South Africa. 228 DeBeers' actions represent a
common issue as to whether multinational corporations can justify
opportunistic behavior on the basis of the economic and social
development that their actions are otherwise providing.
Apart from the public pressures that have resulted and are likely
to continue to squeeze DeBeers, an Adapted Firm would not resort to
Corporate Opportunism because it is exactly this kind of behavior
that is likely to blow up, perhaps quite literally, in one's face. Ideally,
DeBeers should change its local practices in order to operate
consistently with hypergoals and norms.
If the economic
development is so strong and important, however, to preclude that
from happening, then DeBeers may continue to purchase diamonds,
but more-proactively support the development and enforcement of
laws designed to reduce the degree of problematic behavior in the
future. That is, a short-term decision to engage in problematic
behavior does not preclude obligations to contribute to the larger
resolution of the underlying problem.
The diamond cutters of Antwerp represent a harder case to
analyze. Although the Nationalist does respect the laws of its home
country and therefore is open to a measure of external evaluation, it

227.
There is also no evidence of the kind of corporate community DeBeers
maintains and the extent to which it is open to gender equity, voice, identity, and small
groups.
228.
Zachary Wales, S. Africa Mine Empowerment Eyes World Bank, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Nov. 1, 2002, available at Lexis, News Library, UPI File.
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is difficult to analyze the actions of the diamond cutters because there
is little transparency. Perhaps the diamond cutters operate in an
admirable way, but in working in an industry with the difficulties of
diamond extraction, they will be tainted as well unless they are very
transparent. One might even articulate a rule of thumb that states
that the more the industry has a reputation for unethical behavior,
such as violating human rights or consistent, significant fouling of the
environment, the more there is a need for corporate transparency in
order to counteract assumptions that all corporations engaged in that
industry practice similar, unethical behavior. Similarly, there is little
evidence as to what kind of community is fostered within the
corporation itself, and no indications that the cutters use their access
to the country in a way to promote the rule of law in that country or
to act as responsible citizens in it. As with the Opportunist, there is
some economic development, but as previously noted, economic
development, although necessary, is not sufficient to guarantee
sustainable peace. Economic development must proceed in a just way
in order to promote sustainable peace.
Finally, there are the actions of Tiffany's. Tiffany's acts as an
Imperialist. Although the Imperialists tend to be very attentive to
notions of universal laws, they are sometimes deaf to the realities of
the local situation. Tiffany's actions probably do provide assistance in
terms of citizenship and mediation, and Tiffany's is attuned to the
development of its own corporate community. What is unclear is how
attentive it is to the realities of the countries where diamonds are
mined. If it demands overly-rigorous standards, it may cause harm
by undercutting critically important potential economic development.
In this instance, the Adapted Firm would realize the need for
universal hypergoals in order to sustain itself and survive, but it
would also recognize the need to adapt to specific situations as well.
Although it may seem that a hypergoal such as transparency might
need to be sacrificed, this is not the case. The norms leading to the
hypergoal of sustainable peace hang together in a balance. Knowing
which to apply requires a wisdom Aristotle described as phronesis, a
term that a leading Aristotelian business ethicist, Robert Solomon,
It is not an abstract
defines as "sensitivity and imagination." 22 9
concept, but a practical judgment based on solid training and practice
that brings to bear such experience and knowledge on the
particularities of the specific case. 230 As is the case with most
managerial issues, including those with ethical dimensions, there is
no simple computer calculation that can produce a correct moral
answer. Because one norm leading to sustainable peace is sensitivity

229.
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to local community needs, it might be that Tiffany's insistence on
transparency and human rights must be blended with economic
development.
Thoughtful managers who regularly consider the
connection between business and peace will be in a position to apply
their developed moral skills to the complexities of a case and to do so
wisely.
We fully admit that this category is the hardest one to
implement and that reasonable people can disagree on the exact
policies optimally implemented.
Yet, it seems that the
implementation of a policy with a hypergoal of contributing to
sustainable peace in conjunction with a hypergoal of transparency
offers the opportunity for constructive resolution of difficult
dilemmas.

V. CONCLUSION

We believe that a strong case exists for the existence of
hypergoals.
Hypergoals are mandatory for corporations.
A
hypergoal, such as sustainable peace, is rooted in our very nature as
human beings. In order to make it relevant as a factor in decisions,
the hypergoal of sustainable peace must be articulated as an aspect of
human nature just as, more popularly, a narrow view of self-interest
is articulated. In working toward the hypergoal of sustainable peace,
corporations must attend to two tiers: an immediate, short-term
orientation to foster solidarity with local populations in which the
corporation works, and a longer-term orientation to abide by the
specific norms that have been linked to sustainable peace.
The case of conflict diamonds demonstrates the difference
between four different kinds of strategic options typically utilized by
global firms in making decisions: Imperialist, Nationalist,
Opportunist, and Pragmatist. Our model of the Adapted Firm,
however, demonstrates how these approaches would change in the
case of conflict diamonds and also provides a workable two-tiered
analysis for survival in the short-term and sustainable peace in the
long-term. The Adapted Firm is most likely to achieve the hypergoal
of contributing to sustainable peace.
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